

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

Joint reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302 and to the Office and Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503

1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)

2. REPORT DATE

17 January 1995

3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED

FINAL - From 1994 to 1994

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE

TOWARD A COMPREHENSIVE NAVAL PLANNING DOCTRINE

5. FUNDING NUMBERS

6. AUTHOR(S)

CDR WAYNE J. ROWE, USN; LTCOL ARTHUR A. ADKINS, USMC; CAPT KENNETH W. PETERS, USN

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

US NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
STRATEGIC RESEARCH DEPARTMENT (CODE 30)
CENTER FOR NAVAL WARFARE STUDIES
686 CUSHING ROAD
NEWPORT, RI 02840-12078. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION
REPORT NUMBER

RESEARCH REPORT 1-95

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

US NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
686 CUSHING ROAD
NEWPORT, RI 02840-120710. SPONSORING/MONITORING
AGENCY REPORT NUMBER

12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION IS UNLIMITED

12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE

13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words)

This document was prepared in response to a request from the Naval Doctrine Command to help develop a new Naval Doctrine Publication, NDP-5, Naval Planning. It describes the basic tenets of military planning and the more specific tenets of naval planning. It also describes how naval planning fits within joint operations and the overarching strategic/political superstructure. It examines both the unique planning requirements mandated by the nature of naval forces, and the planning considerations mandated by successful joint/combined operations.

19950207 010

14. SUBJECT TERMS

NAVAL PLANNING; MILITARY PLANNING

15. NUMBER OF PAGES

88

16. PRICE CODE

17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF
REPORT

UNCLASSIFIED

18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
OF THIS PAGE

UNCLASSIFIED

19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
OF ABSTRACT

UNCLASSIFIED

20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT

NONE

NSN 7540-01-280-5500


Standard Form 298 (Rev 2-89)

Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18

298-102

**An Occasional Paper of
The Center for Naval
Warfare Studies**

Toward A Comprehensive Naval Planning Doctrine



**Commander Wayne J. Rowe, USN
Lieutenant Colonel Arthur A. Adkins, USMC
Captain Kenneth W. Peters, USN**

**Strategic Research Department
Research Report 1-95**

U.S. Naval War College



DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

**Approved for public release;
Distribution Unlimited**



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
686 CUSHING ROAD
NEWPORT RI 02841-1207

17 January 1995

TOWARD A COMPREHENSIVE NAVAL PLANNING DOCTRINE

This document was prepared in response to a request from the Commander, Naval Doctrine Command, that the President, Naval War College, provide assistance in developing *Naval Doctrine Publication-5, Naval Planning* (NDP-5). The Naval War College has long been the Reviewing Authority for NWP-11, *Naval Operational Planning*, and was therefore the logical choice to aid the Doctrine Command in this project.

Here at the Naval War College, the Strategic Research Department of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies, working closely with the Joint Military Operations Department (keeper of NWP-11), prepared this input for use by the Doctrine Command. The project proved both challenging and rewarding, and the College looks forward to working with the Naval Doctrine Command again in the future.

DONALD C. F. DANIEL
Director and Professor
Strategic Research Department
Center for Naval Warfare Studies

| | |
|---------------------|--|
| Accession For | |
| NTIS CRA&I | <input checked="checked" type="checkbox"/> |
| DTIC TAB | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Unannounced | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Justification | |
| By | |
| Distribution / | |
| Availability Codes | |
| Dist | Avail and/or Special |
| A-1 | |

*Few events traumatize a nation more than losing a war. Defeat can bring down an empire, alter national boundaries, and sovereignty, and dramatically change a society's social structure. Failures are explained in many ways and are seldom of a singular nature. Their roots, however, can be traced to the **planning for war**. For this reason, no other peacetime activity should command more attention from military leaders and scholars than the study of military planning...¹*

1. LTCol Harry R. Borowski, USAF, ed., Military Planning in the Twentieth Century, (Military History Symposium, USAF Academy, 1986), p. 1.

FOREWORD

The first naval capstone publication NDP-1 Naval Warfare, described doctrine as the foundation upon which our tactics, techniques and procedures are built. NDP-5 Naval Planning focuses on naval doctrine associated with how we think about employing forces to win wars, i.e., with how we plan. Sound planning doctrine supports the myriad of techniques and procedures utilized in military planning and encompasses the full spectrum of military operations.

This publication describes the basic tenets of military planning and the more specific tenets of naval planning. It also describes how naval planning fits within joint operations and the overarching strategic/political superstructure. It examines both the unique planning requirements mandated by the nature of naval forces, and the planning considerations mandated by successful joint/combined operations. NDP-5 presents broad guidance for the total Navy and Marine Corps team. The effectiveness and success of our operations demand that every naval professional understand its contents.

INTRODUCTION

The basic requirement of decentralized operations in general war is preplanned response in accordance with commonly understood doctrine. Lord Nelson did not win at Trafalgar because he had a great plan, although his plan was great. He won because his subordinate commanders thoroughly understood that plan and their place in it well in advance of plan execution.

— Vice Admiral Henry C. Mustin III, USN
Commander Second Fleet / JTF 120
Fighting Instructions, 1986

NDP-1 Naval Warfare asserts that:

The success of a military organization is directly associated with its doctrine. . . . Naval doctrine forms a bridge between the naval component of our nation's military strategy and our tactics, techniques and procedures, such as those found in our Naval Warfare Publications (NWP) and Fleet Marine Force Manuals (FMFM). A commander, however, cannot operate solely under the guidance of broad strategy. Neither can he make appropriate mission decisions if guided only by tactics and techniques. Doctrine guides our actions toward well-defined goals and provides the basis for mutual understanding within and between Services and our national policymakers. It ensures our familiarity and efficiency in the execution of procedures and tactics. (p. 43)

In its simplest form, planning is little more than directed thinking. Any time we are thinking about the solution of a military problem, whether it concerns a routine logistics question or direct combat operations, we are planning. The logic, processes, systems and political impetus involved in shaping, structuring and formatting the naval portion of joint planning are the subjects of **NDP-5 Naval Planning**.

Chapter One provides a general overview of the terms, concepts and basics

of planning. **Chapter Two** introduces the broad national strategic planning structure and its connection to military planning, while **Chapter Three** examines the specific planning processes utilized to solve military problems. **Chapter Four** focuses on the products of planning. Most naval officers have already encountered these in one form or another in daily message traffic. NDP-5 will help clarify the "why" and "how" behind the "what" seen on the message board.

NDP-5, however, is about planning; it is not about how to plan. That information is found one echelon down in NWP-11, Naval Operational Planning, and FMFM 3-1, Command and Staff Action, which contain current guidelines and formats for naval operation planning. They are the "how to" manuals for naval planners.

Planning systems and processes are nothing more than aids to commanders; they are hedges against human error, assurances that no reasonable options are left inadvertently unexplored. They are not substitutes for common sense,

SPECTRUM OF PLANNING

From a World War II Pacific Campaign perspective, planning conducted at the Presidential and Chief of Naval Operations level (Mr. Roosevelt/Admiral King) was big-picture, long-range, all-encompassing and required large staffs to maintain. Planning conducted at the CNO and theater commander level (Admiral Nimitz) by necessity was more specific and detailed. At the next level, the theater commander and tactical commander (Admiral Halsey) usually had less reaction time, and the planning was even more focused. Once ashore, Marine company and field grade officers were usually their own planning staffs, making instantaneous decisions, often under fire. The Roosevelt/King planning process may have been more formal and structured than the one used by Marine Majors and Captains, but the latter process

experience or judgment. Faced with a broad range of mission profiles, complicated by operating in joint/combined arenas, every naval officer must be well-versed in the basics of planning in general and with the specifics of naval operation planning.

Contents

Naval Planning

| | |
|---|-------------|
| FOREWORD | i |
| INTRODUCTION | iii |
| CHAPTER ONE | |
| THE BASICS OF PLANNING | 1 |
| Military Planning | 3 |
| Terms and Concepts | 5 |
| The Military Planning Logic | 10 |
| CHAPTER TWO | |
| NATIONAL SECURITY AND OPERATION PLANNING | 13 |
| National Systems and Processes | 14 |
| Joint Operation Planning | 21 |
| Naval Operation Planning | 25 |
| CHAPTER THREE | |
| THE METHODOLOGY | 31 |
| The Joint Operation Planning Processes | 32 |
| The Naval Planning and Decision-Making Process | 40 |
| Process Interaction | 46 |
| CHAPTER FOUR | |
| PLANNING PRODUCTS | 51 |
| Deliberate Planning Products | 52 |
| Crisis Action Planning Products | 54 |
| Naval Operation Planning Products | 58 |
| CONCLUSION | 63 |
| GLOSSARY | GL-1 |
| ANNEX | |
| A - Navy OpOrder in Message Format | A-1 |
| B - USMC Operation Plan/Order Outline | B-1 |
| C - Sample Operation Order | C-1 |

Figures

Naval Planning

Figure

| | | |
|------|---|----|
| 1.1 | Military Planning Logic | 11 |
| 2.1 | Joint Strategic Planning System | 16 |
| 2.2 | The Joint Planning and Execution Community | 23 |
| 3.1 | Deliberate Planning Process | 33 |
| 3.2 | Concept Development Phase | 34 |
| 3.3 | Plan Development Phase | 35 |
| 3.4 | Crisis Action Planning Process | 38 |
| 3.5 | Naval Planning and Decision-Making Process | 41 |
| 3.6 | Naval Planning and Decision-Making Process Estimate of the Situation Phase, NAVY STEPS: | 42 |
| 3.7 | Naval Planning and Decision-Making Process Plans, Directives, and Supervision, NAVY STEPS: | 43 |
| 3.8 | Naval Planning and Decision-Making Process Estimate of the Situation Phase, MARINE CORPS STEPS: | 45 |
| 3.9 | Naval Planning and Decision-Making Process Plans, Directives, and Supervision, MARINE CORPS STEPS: | 46 |
| 3.10 | Deliberate Planning: - Process Interaction | 48 |
| 3.11 | Crisis Action Planning: - Process Interaction | 49 |

CHAPTER ONE

THE BASICS OF PLANNING

The fourth general lesson of the Persian Gulf conflict is the importance, in a highly uncertain world, of sound planning. . . . Our response in the crisis was greatly aided because we had planned for such a contingency.

— Former Secretary of Defense, Dick Cheney

Until relatively recently in the history of warfare, military planning was assumed to be the exclusive province of a few gifted leaders, and the outcome of war dependent on inborn genius in generalship. Prussia's defeat by France in 1806 (due to the presence of Napoleon and the conspicuous absence of Prussian genius) eventually led to the revolutionary concept that the art of military command, to include planning, could be taught. To this end, the first war college, the *Kriegsakademie*, was established in Berlin in 1810 and the Prussian general staff became the model of the systematic approach to warfare.

Nevertheless, when the U.S. Naval War College (the first such American institution) was founded in 1884 under the stewardship of Commodore Stephen B. Luce, many Americans still believed that war was best left to inspired amateurs led by a Washingtonian-style genius who would undoubtedly reveal himself in the time of need. Luce preferred a more scientific approach and was particularly impressed with the well-developed body of literature in Europe concerning military planning, referred to as "The System" or "The Estimate of the Situation". After a few years of adaptation and "modernization," Military Planning was officially introduced into the Naval War College curriculum in 1910. (see historical insert)

HISTORICAL INSERT

As early as 1895, the Naval War College was drafting war plans utilizing an early form of the "estimate process." In 1907, in conjunction with the General Board in Washington, the College staff drafted the first series of "War Portfolios." The War College continued to plan for the General Board until the Chief of Naval Operations assumed those duties in 1915. During that period, no other agency in the Navy appeared capable of doing this type of staff action.

In fact, since the birth of modern formal planning in the United States Naval Service until 1948 when Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, then President of the Naval War College, advocated it be moved to the office of the Chief of Naval Operations, the methodology for operational planning appears to have been the exclusive province of the Naval War College. The Naval War College officially introduced The Estimate of the Situation into the curriculum in the form of a lecture given to the 26 officer students of the summer class of 1910.

The first Estimate of the Situation pamphlet was written in 1915 by then president of the College, Rear Admiral Austin M. Knight. The pamphlet was routinely revised by each succeeding president until 1926 when the estimate and order form were combined into one planning manual entitled: *The Estimate of the Situation, with the Order Form*.

Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, who became president of the War College in 1934, expanded the 40-50 page pamphlet into a 243-page book. Unfortunately, it was difficult to read and dedicated few pages to the actual process of preparing a plan. It was, however, read, discussed and used extensively through the end of World War II.

Admiral Spruance, who had also served on Admiral Kalbfus' staff at Newport returned as president of the War College in 1946 and, armed with his extensive planning experience of WWII and considerable intellect, supervised the production of a "simplified and reduced" version of the Estimate of the Situation. Under Admiral Spruance's direction and supervision, the Estimate of the Situation was carefully compared to the most recent joint texts prepared by the War Department. It was determined that the basic steps in the Estimate of the Situation were completely compatible with joint and other service procedures.

In 1948 the Chief of Naval Operations published the first doctrinal manual on naval operational planning from the original draft submitted by Admiral Spruance. The *Naval Manual of Operational Planning, 1948*, was 48 pages long and, at least conceptually, survives today as NWP-11, *Naval Planning*, and the planning portion of FMFM 3-1, *Command and Staff Action*.

HISTORY OF PLANNING

Although adaptation and modernization has continued through the years, the logic of present-day military planning is firmly rooted in late 19th century Prussian military instruction.¹ For the modern reader, however, the discussion must begin with a basic understanding of current terms and concepts as defined in **Joint Pub 5-0, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations***. The specific questions to be discussed in this chapter are:

What is Military Planning?

What are the terms and concepts we need to be familiar with to begin the discussion on Military Planning?

What is the basic Military Planning Logic?

MILITARY PLANNING

Planning is so fundamental that it almost defies definition. We utilize it in everyday life and it ranges from "thinking" about simple problems to complex, detailed decision-making and preparation for combat action. Military Planning is often a matter of applying common sense to relatively simple problems. The complex nature of Military Planning stems as much from the difficulty in harnessing and orchestrating all the individual "directed thinking" that goes into preparing for the defense of a nation, as it does from the actual difficulty of the problems themselves. The orchestration begins by breaking down Military Planning into two broad categories: *Force* and *Operational Planning*.

1. For a more detailed account see Charles W. Cullen, "From the *Kriegsakademie* to the Naval War College: The Military Planning Process," Naval War College Review, January 1970, pp. 6-18.

Force Planning is associated with the creation and maintenance of military capabilities. It is primarily the responsibility of the Service Secretaries and the Service Chiefs. Although Force Planning is outside the main focus of this publication, it is intricately related to Operation Planning which concerns itself with the utilization the forces, equipment and sustainment acquired through Force Planning.

Operation planning is directed toward the employment of military forces within the context of a military strategy and encompasses all related administrative, intelligence, logistic and command and control functions. It is performed sequentially and simultaneously at the strategic, operational and tactical

"History has shown that military genius is rare; that many battles and campaigns are won by the commander who, by logical reasoning and careful planning, is able to evaluate the situation correctly, issue clear directives, and adapt himself to changing conditions as actions develop. For this reason a process has been evolved whereby the commander can reach a solution in a logical, orderly manner, with adequate safeguards against the oversight of important details. Events may turn a poorly conceived plan into a brilliant victory, and they may turn a seemingly sound plan into a dismal failure. Success is however, more apt to fall on the side of a well-conceived and carefully prepared plan."

OPERATIONAL GENIUS VS PLANNING ²

levels of war to produce a joint operation plan that represents -- along with all associated functional, supporting and subordinate plans --the best possible preparation for execution of military actions in support of specific national objectives.

Operation Planning is the focus of this manual and is further broken down into two categories: joint operation planning and naval operation planning. Joint operation planning refers to "total force" planning. The United States has one military arm and joint operation

2. USAF Command and Staff School Manual One (CSSM-1), p. 35.

planning optimizes its utilization. Naval operation planning is the refinement of joint operation planning to specifically direct the employment of maritime forces. Naval operation planning is prescribed by, and is a subset of, joint operation planning.

TERMS AND CONCEPTS³

Like any discipline, planning has its own set of terms and concepts that facilitate communication among those who understand them and frustrate those who do not. Key terms, phrases and concepts we will cover here are: basic precepts of planning, scope of planning, planning process, planning product, contingency planning, adaptive planning, levels of planning, types of planning and categories of forces for planning.

Basic Precepts of Planning. Planning and operations are inseparable. The principles of war (*unity of command, economy of force, objective, mass, maneuver, offense, simplicity, surprise, security*) that apply to military operations, apply to planning as well. It follows then that the basic military concepts that apply to operations apply to planning as well.

Centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities, decisive points, focus of effort, lines of operation/communication, culminating points, commander's intent and tempo must be considered at least as important during the planning phase of the operation as during the execution phase. Considerations such as weather and terrain, and fundamentals such as interoperability and mutually supportive doctrine must also all be taken into account by planners. Military

3. Joint Pub 1-02, "The DOD Dictionary" and Joint Pub 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations are the source publications for the definition of terms used in NDP-5.

planning is the foundation for successful warfare. All of the basic precepts that affect operations also affect planning and must be taken into consideration.

Scope of Planning. Operation planning encompasses planning for the full range of activities required for conducting military operations. These activities include the mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment of forces.

Planning Process. A planning process is a specific set of procedures designed to aid commanders in the methodical and orderly solution of military problems. The three planning processes to be discussed in this publication are: the Deliberate Planning Process utilized by joint force commanders to develop operation plans for contingencies identified in joint strategic planning documents; the Crisis Action Planning Process utilized by joint force commanders to develop time-sensitive operation orders and plans in response to an imminent crisis; and the Naval Planning and Decision-making Process utilized by naval commanders who are primarily concerned with the decisions and details associated with the tactical employment of naval forces. The Naval Planning and Decision-making Process is associated with both the Deliberate and Crisis Action Planning Process.⁴

Planning Product. In general terms, the product of planning is a plan which can range from an unwritten general idea of what the commander wants his unit to do, to a formal OPLAN approved by the President of the United States. The products of the Deliberate Planning

4 Chapter Three discusses the planning processes.

Process are: Operation Plans (OPLANS), Concept Plans (CONPLANS) and Functional Plans. The products of the Crisis Action Planning Process are Operation Orders (OPORDs) and Campaign Plans. The Naval Planning and Decision-making Process produces Naval Operation Plans and directives. In some cases Naval Operation Plans may be referred to as Supporting or Subordinate Plans.⁵

Contingency Planning. Contingency planning is the development of plans for potential crisis situations which may involve military forces. In simple terms, this involves looking at the world, trying to determine what might threaten national security and putting a plan together to counter it. It is usually closely associated with the Deliberate Planning Process, because if the situation requires Crisis Action Planning, it has passed the "contingency" phase and is considered an actual threat to national security.

Adaptive Planning. Given the uncertainties of the planning environment, taskings for most deliberate plans require the preparation of several response options (flexible deterrent options, employment of decisive force, and response to no-warning attack) possibly using different sets of forces and resources to allow the joint force commander to "adapt" to the current situation. Planning for such options is referred to in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan as *adaptive planning*.⁶

5 Chapter Four discusses planning products.

6 Chapter Two discusses the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.

Levels of Planning. Levels of planning correlate to the levels of war: strategic, operational and tactical.

Strategic-level planning provides for the global and theater employment of national capabilities to achieve national security and military objectives. This planning considers global requirements, national capabilities, and the theater strategies and campaigns of the combatant commanders.

Operational-level planning focuses on organizing and positioning assigned and augmenting forces for the conduct of theater campaigns or major operations to attain strategic and/or theater objectives.

Tactical-level planning centers around the detailed decision-making and preparation associated with employment of combat units.

Types of Planning. Joint Pub 5-0, *Doctrine For Planning Joint Operations*, identifies six different types of planning: Military Planning, Force Planning, Operation Planning, Campaign Planning, Deliberate Planning and Crisis Action Planning. Military Planning subsumes Force Planning and Operation Planning. Operation Planning subsumes Deliberate Planning and Crisis Action Planning with Campaign Planning providing an overlaying structure which may be applied to either Deliberate or Crisis Action Planning. Although not specifically addressed in Joint Pub 5-0, naval operation planning and other Service-specific and functional

area operation planning are considered a sub-sets of joint operation planning.

Categories of Forces for Planning. Three categories are utilized to define the availability of forces and resources for planning and conducting military operations:

Assigned forces and resources are those in being that have been placed under the combatant command⁷ of a unified commander by the Secretary of Defense. Forces and resources so assigned are available for normal peacetime operations of that command.

Apportioned forces and resources are those made available to the combatant commander for deliberate planning by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.

Allocated forces and resources are those provided by the National Command Authorities (NCA)⁸ for execution planning or actual implementation. The allocation of forces and resources is accomplished through procedures established for crisis action planning.

7 See pg GL-6 for discussion on combatant command (command authority.)

8 The National Command Authorities are the President and the Secretary of Defense or their duly deputized alternates or successors.

THE MILITARY PLANNING LOGIC.⁹


While specific planning processes have been established for different military problems as discussed above, there is a "basic" or "general" military planning logic common to most military problem-solving. The Military Planning Logic divides the solution of a military problem into four phases: the commander's estimate of the situation; development of detailed plans; preparation of the directive; and, supervision of the planned action. These four phases of this basic logic provide the foundation for the specific procedures in *all the formal military planning processes*.

In the first phase, a commander analyzes his mission and the friendly and enemy situation, then decides on a course of action. Once a course of action has been selected by the commander, the staff begins detailed planning for the execution of that course of action. Phase two ends when the commander approves the plan. Phase three is the preparation and issuance of the directive that initiates the planned action. Phase four is the supervision and adjustment of the planned action as required. It ends with the completion of the assigned mission, or the receipt of a new mission. (See Figure 1.1)

This planning logic may be applied in any number of ways ranging from a commander's nearly instantaneous mental calculations under fire to the two-year cycle of the Deliberate Planning Process. Military problems vary tremendously in character, scope and time available. *Planning Processes* are specifically tailored to aid commanders in solving

9 The "Military Planning **Process**" is the more common phrase found in military writings. Both phrases refer to the basic logic associated with military problem solving, dating back to the Prussian *Kriegsakademie*. Potential confusion stems from the fact that "The Military Planning Process" infers that it is *the* formal planning process utilized by "the military" when in fact, it is not a "formal process" at all. It provides a basic "Military Planning Logic," but prescribes no set procedures or actions for commanders and staff officers. For that reason NDP-5 will refer to it exclusively by the latter title.

Figure 1.1
MILITARY PLANNING LOGIC



different types of military problems, but the *planning logic* remains remarkably consistent throughout the different processes.

In summary, Military Planning, much like ordinary, everyday, non-military planning, is based on common sense. When it comes to the sheer number of military problems associated with the defense of a nation, however, harnessing, directing and orchestrating simple common sense becomes a major endeavor. Military Planning is categorized as either Force or Operation Planning. The latter can be further divided into Joint Operation Planning and Naval Operation Planning and is the focus of this publication.

Like any specialty field, Military Planning is based on certain precepts and relies heavily on common terminology to facilitate communications between planners. Everything that the operator must take into consideration must also be taken into account by the planner.

Sound planning is the basis for successful military operations. A good planner must think of, and consider, everything.

Planning processes are specifically tailored to the needs of the commander at different levels of war and different details and time-sensitivities, but the Military Planning Logic remains constant regardless of the planning process utilized or the scope or immediacy of the problem. From instantaneous decision-making under fire to the multi-year Deliberate Planning Process, commanders utilize the Military Planning Logic to make an estimate of the situation and decide on a course of action; conduct detailed planning as required and as time allows; issue the directive; and supervise the planned action.

CHAPTER TWO

NATIONAL SECURITY AND OPERATION PLANNING

"War is merely the continuation of policy by other means. . . . The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose."

— Carl Von Clausewitz¹

Naval expeditionary forces are a vital part of America's total military capability. Navy and Marine Corps officers, if they are to be effective commanders, must understand naval operation planning and how it fits in the overarching national military strategy and planning structure. This chapter covers three basic questions to begin the discussion on operation planning:

What are the national-level systems that provide impetus and direction to military planning?

How is broad strategic guidance translated into detailed operation plans for the overall defense of a nation and its interests?

Where does naval operation planning fit in?

Although sometimes difficult to visualize at the tactical level, all military action must be firmly rooted in national will, and be consonant with national policy, goals and objectives. The intricate and interactive relationships between political decision-making and military action, however, comprise a vast field of study. The overview

1. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, translated by M. Howard and P. Praret, (Princeton, NJ, Princeton, Univ Press, 1976), p. 87.

presented here is intended only as a brief introduction and foundation for later discussions on joint military and naval operation planning.

NATIONAL SYSTEMS AND PROCESSES

A basic understanding of the political/military decision-making system that provides the impetus and guidance for strategic, operational and tactical military action is a prerequisite to understanding operation planning. Four primary, interrelated, national-level systems or processes articulate national security policy and national military strategy, thus providing strategic direction for operation planning: the National Security Council System; the Joint Strategic Planning System; the Planning Programming and Budgeting System; and, the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System.²

The National Security Council System. The National Security Act of 1947 established the National Security Council (NSC) as the principal forum to consider national security policy issues requiring Presidential decision.³ The NSC system provides the framework for establishing national security strategy and policy objectives. The NSC develops policy options, considers implications, coordinates operational problems that

2. Joint Publication 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations, (Washington, DC, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1993), p. II-1.

3. Composition, influence, and schedule of meetings of the NSC varies considerably depending on the personality of the President and his key advisors. **Statutory membership**, is limited to the President, Vice President, Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State, with the Director of Central Intelligence and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff serving as **statutory advisors**.

require interdepartmental consideration, develops recommendations for the President, and monitors policy implementation. By statute, the NSC produces an unclassified publication for the President entitled the National Security Strategy. It also oversees the preparation of Presidential Decision Directives (PDDs) in the national security area. When signed by the President, PDDs and the National Security Strategy set out national security policy, and are the foundation of military planning.⁴


The Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS). The JSPS is a flexible, interactive system intended to provide supporting military advice to the DOD Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS), and strategic guidance for use in the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES). The JSPS provides the means for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) in consultation with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders to: **review** the national security environment and U.S. national security objectives; **evaluate** threats to achieving those objectives; **assess** current strategy and existing or proposed programs and budgets; and, **propose** military strategy, programs, and forces necessary to achieve national security objectives in a resource limited environment, consistent with policies and priorities established by the President and the Secretary of Defense.

The purpose and outputs of the JSPS are summarized in Figure 2-1.⁵ As depicted in the chart, the central process of the JSPS is the Joint Strategy Review (JSR)

4. Joint Pub 5-0, p. II-1,2 and AFSC Pub 1, pp. 5-1 to 5-4, have additional discussion on the NSC system.

5. Joint Pub 5-0, p. II-6 and Memorandum of Policy No. 7 (MOP 7), "Joint Strategic Planning System", 1st rev, (Washington, DC, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1993), has additional discussion on the JSPS.

which assesses the strategic environment for issues and factors that may affect the National Military Strategy. The JSR process produces the four mutually supportive documents of the JSPS: The National Military Strategy (NMS), the Joint Planning Document (JPD), the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), and the Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA).



The National Military Strategy is the Chairman's official recommendation to

the President, National Security Council and the Secretary of Defense on how the military can best execute the National Security Strategy and what force structure will be required to support national security objectives. Once reviewed by the Secretary of Defense and approved by the President, the NMS becomes one of the primary source documents for operation planning.

The Joint Planning Document supports the NMS by providing the Chairman's concise programming priorities, requirements or advice to the Secretary of Defense for eventual input into the PPBS. Published as stand-alone documents addressing specific functional areas, JPD volumes are prepared with coordinated input from combatant commanders, Service Chiefs and Defense agencies.

The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan is based on current military capabilities and provides the Chairman's guidance to combatant commanders and Service Chiefs to accomplish assigned tasks and missions. It apportions resources to combatant commanders and establishes a coherent framework for capabilities-based military advice provided to the NCA, and is the primary vehicle by which combatant commanders are tasked to begin deliberate planning.

The Chairman's Program Assessment summarizes the Chairman's views on the balance and adequacy of the programmed force, and the support levels required to attain U.S. national security objectives.⁶

6. Joint Pub 5-0, p. II-10, has additional discussion on JSPS plans and documents and related assessments.

The Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS). The PPBS provides the framework for the acquisition and allocation of resources to meet the warfighting needs of the combatant commanders.⁷ Although a highly sophisticated and intricate process, its basic goal is to select and allocate funding for the right mix of people, material and support to successfully complete our assigned missions. PPBS is part of the force planning process but is closely associated with operation planning. Operation planning provides the basis for and validates combatant commander's input to the PPBS; and, in turn, operation planning is ultimately constrained by PPBS fiscal realities. Simply put, what we would like to be able to do and what we can afford to do may be two entirely different things.⁸

The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES). JOPES is the principal system within the Department of Defense for translating policy decisions into military action. JOPES provides standardized procedures and policies to aid joint force commanders in converting the national-level guidance provided by the National Security Council system and the Joint Strategic Planning System (specifically the NMS and the JSCP) into operation plans and orders.

7. Joint Pub 1-02, "The DOD Dictionary" defines *combatant commander* as a Commander in Chief (CINC) of one of the Unified or Specified combatant commands established by the President. ie. CINCEUR, CINCCENT, CINCPAC, USACOM, CINCTRANS, CINCSTRAT.

8. Joint Pub 5-0, pp. II-2-6, and AFSC Pub-1, pp. 5-4-5, have additional discussion on the PPBS.

Primary Goals. The primary goals of JOPES are to:

Support the development of operation plans (OPLANs) and operation orders (OPORDs).

Permit theater commanders to start, stop, or redirect military operations effectively and rapidly.

Support peacetime, crisis, and wartime planning and execution.

Integrate mobilization, deployment, employment, and sustainment activities.

Standardize policies and procedures which will be similar, if not identical, in peacetime (including exercises) and crisis situations.

Support the rapid development and evaluation of military options and courses of action in single or multi-theater scenarios.

Expedite the development of military estimates of an emergent situation.

Ensure the dissemination and presentation of timely, accurate, and properly aggregated information.

Allow planners to identify resource shortfalls (personnel, transportation, material, forces, medical and engineering services).

Functions. JOPES contains five basic planning functions: threat identification and assessment, strategy determination, course of action development, detailed planning, and implementation.

Threat identification involves ascertaining actual and potential threats to

national security, alerting decision-makers, and then determining capabilities and, where possible, intentions of the threat. This function provides information for strategic planning and resource allocation at the national/strategic level, developing courses of action and detailed planning at the operational level, and monitoring and adjusting operations during execution down to and including the tactical level.

Strategy determination involves formulating politico-military assessments, developing strategic concepts and options, apportioning forces and other resources, and formulating planning guidance. This function links theater/operational level and national /strategic level, facilitating communication between combatant commanders and the NCA.

Course of action (COA) development is the process wherein the supported commander's staff develops and tests alternative COAs based on national/strategic level task assignments, guidance, and force and resource allocation. This facilitates the development of the combatant commanders' Strategic Concept in deliberate planning and his Commander's Estimate in crisis action planning.

Detailed planning supports preparation of the approved concept of operations or COA for implementation. It facilitates the development and time-phasing of detailed force lists and required sustainment; development of directives, schedules, and orders; determination of support requirements such as medical, engineering, air refueling, host nation and transportation needs; and, identification and resolution of force and resource shortfalls and constraints. The result is the develop-

ment of detailed, fully integrated mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment and redeployment activities based on the approved concept of operations or course of action.

Implementation procedures give decision-makers the tools to monitor, analyze, and manage plan execution. Of particular importance is the ability to redirect forces, adjust priorities, or otherwise influence events as the situation unfolds. Implementation usually ends with some type of replanning effort, such as redeployment or redirection of operations.

Combatant commanders use JOPES to determine the best method of accomplishing assigned tasks; to develop plans; and to direct the actions necessary to accomplish the mission. JOPES incorporates two separate but mutually supportive processes: the Deliberate Planning and Crisis Action Planning Processes.

JOINT OPERATION PLANNING

Joint operations and joint planning refer to the entirety of the nation's military capabilities; i.e., not just different services doing or planning things in close proximity to each other, but planning and doing things in support of the larger goals. The phrase **joint planning**, for instance, does not exclusively refer to joint staff planning. It encompasses all planning efforts, regardless of physical location or echelon of command, conducted in support of specific national goals and objectives. The headquarters, commands, and agencies involved in planning for the mobilization, training,

preparation, movement, reception, employment, support and sustainment of U.S. forces are collectively known as the **Joint Planning and Execution Community**, with the National Command Authorities at the head. (See Figure 2.2)


National Command Authorities. Ultimate authority and responsibility for national defense rests with the President. As addressed earlier, the National Security Council was created to assist the President and function as the principal forum for the development of national security policy. The Secretary of Defense is a member of the National Security Council and principal adviser to the President for all matters relating to the Department of Defense.

The President and the Secretary of Defense or their duly appointed alternates or successors are the National Command Authorities. The NCA alone are vested with the lawful authority to direct the U.S. Armed Forces in the execution of military action, and are therefore ultimately responsible for the military's total planning effort.

The Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC). The JPEC consists of the NCA, the Chairman and other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Staff, the Services, the combatant commands and their component commands, subunified commands, joint task forces (if established), and Defense agencies. The Chairman, in conjunction with other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, manages the joint operation planning process. He also organizes the JPEC for joint operation planning by establishing supported and supporting command relationships between the

Figure 2.2

The Joint Planning and Execution Community.



NOTE: Figure 2.2 depicts key members of the JPEC; not command and control relationships. Naval officers serve in most, if not all, of these commands and agencies.

combatant commands.⁹ A supported commander is identified for each major planning effort, as are supporting commanders, Services, U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), and Department of Defense (DOD) agencies as appropriate. This process provides for unity of command in the planning and execution of joint opera-

9. See Joint Pub 0-2 "Unified Action of Armed Forces", and Joint Pub 3-0 "Doctrine for Joint Operations" for additional discussion on combatant commands, subordinate commands and command relationships.

tions and facilitates unity of effort within the JPEC.

Combatant commanders retain primary responsibility for the preparation and implementation of joint operation/campaign plans. Campaign plans are prepared when the contemplated military operations exceed the scope of a single major joint operation or battle. The Services and USSOCOM provide interoperable forces and logistic support for assignment to the combatant commanders. The Services prepare detailed mobilization, sustainment, and mobility plans containing the identification of the actual forces and support allocated for combatant commander plans.

Service component commands conduct joint planning functions both within the operational chain of command and under administrative control of the Military Departments. Within the administrative chain, they prepare and execute administrative and logistics plans to support operating forces. Within the operational chain of command, Service component commands recommend the proper force composition and employment of Service forces, provide Service force and support information for joint planning, and prepare component-level operation plans or OPORDs in support of tasking assigned to the combatant commands.

Subordinate joint commands (subordinate unified commands and joint task forces), when established, conduct joint planning functions similar to those of the combatant commands for specified missions or designated joint operations areas. Combatant commanders with geographic responsibilities establish theater special operations commands (SOCs) as subordinate unified commands. USSOCOM provides support to theater special operations commands analogous to the support which the

Services provide to their respective Service component commands within the combatant commands.¹⁰ Functional agencies, such as the Defense Intelligence Agency, Defense Logistics Agency and Defense Mapping Agency provide functional support, information and recommendations to the entire JPEC.

NAVAL OPERATION PLANNING

The nation, the armed forces, and each element of the armed forces, down to the lowest echelon must have its own objective. Also, at any level there can be a primary objective and one or more secondary objectives. But this is the important point: the primary and secondary objectives of each echelon must, in the final analysis, contribute to the national objective.

____ Rear Admiral C. R. Brown, USN
"The Principles of War"
United States Naval Institute Proceedings,
June, 1949

Navy and Marine Corps officers and forces are an integral part of our nation's military effort at all echelons of command and levels of war. Planning conducted by naval commanders and staff officers, particularly at the lower echelons, may often appear "naval-specific," but to be effective, it must support national objectives, and is therefore ultimately "joint" planning. Understanding the function of naval planning within the overall Joint Planning and Execution Community is a critical step in understanding naval operation planning.

10. See Joint Pubs 3-05 and 3-05.3 for additional discussion on special operations.

Component Commands. Unified commands, subunified commands and joint task forces are comprised of forces from at least two Services. Normally all four Services and Special Operations Forces will be represented. All Navy and Marine Corps operating forces are under the ultimate operational control of a unified commander. For planning purposes, they may be assigned to more than one.

The senior naval commander under the joint force commander will function as the Naval Forces component commander for the joint command. Marine Corps forces may either be under the Naval Forces commander or a separate Marine Forces commander.¹¹ The joint force commander, in his OPLAN or OPORD, initiates naval operation planning in support of joint operations. The Naval Forces commander (and/or the Marine Forces commander) is directly responsible to the joint force commander for the publication of supporting plans as required.

In turn, the Naval Forces and/or the Marine Forces commander prepares a naval operation plan to support the joint force commander, and direct the actions of his own subordinate commanders. Subordinate commanders develop their plans. . . . and so on right down to the patrol boat and platoon commander.

Service Chiefs. The Service chain is primarily concerned with administrative and logistic support functions, and the operational chain provides the unity of command and effort required for successful warfighting. The 1986 Amendment to the National Security Act delineates the Service Chiefs' responsibilities: train, equip and provide

11. Depending on the situation and the desires of the joint force commander, Marine forces may be organized under the ground forces commander, who may or may not be a Marine officer.

forces to the combatant commanders. The day-to-day business of running the Navy and Marine Corps is done through the Service (administrative) chain. Fitness reports, permanent change of station orders, promotions, courts-martial, all go through the chain of command linking the lowest level tactical commander to the Service Chief and civilian Service Secretary.

Service Chiefs retain the responsibility to provide administrative and logistic support to their respective forces regardless of where they may be assigned operationally and are therefore intricately involved in operation planning. The Navy **Capabilities and Mobilization Plan (NCMP)**, the Marine Corps **Capabilities Plan (MCP)**, and Marine Corps **Mobilization Management Plan (MPLAN)** are the basic planning documents, prepared by the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, for transmitting guidance on mobilization, operation planning support, force capabilities and force allocation for major scenarios identified in the JSCP.

Tactical planning and employment of naval forces will most likely be accomplished by naval commanders in close proximity or coordination with other naval units. Commands at the operational and strategic level, however, will almost always be joint commands. The solid link between "service-specific or naval" planning and execution and "joint" planning and execution is the assignment of specific tasks and missions to subordinate units as we move from the strategic through the operational to the tactical level of war.

In summary, the **National Security Council System** identifies national goals and produces broad policy guidance; the **Joint Strategic Planning System**, within fiscal restraints of the **Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System**, takes the applicable military guidance from the **National Security Council System** and translates it into a **National Military Strategy** and the **Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan**. The **Joint Operation Planning and Execution System** provides the methodology to convert the broad strategic guidance contained in the **National Military Strategy** and the **Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan**, or specific guidance from the President or Secretary of Defense (usually in times of crisis), into planned military action.

Under the guidance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the **Joint Planning and Execution Community** is responsible for orchestrating the entire military planning effort for the defense of the United States and its interests world wide. Utilizing **JOPES** as a management tool, spanning all echelons of command and levels of war, the Joint Planning and Execution Community forges what may at times appear to be fragmented "Service-specific" operation planning into mutually supporting and interlocking pieces.

Navy and Marine Corps officers serve as commanders and staff officers throughout the Joint Planning and Execution Community. The nature of the planning effort with which they are involved at any given time is simply a function of the forces necessary to achieve the military objective contemplated. At the operational level and above, this usually entails the employment of forces from more than one Service, and is obviously joint in nature. At the tactical level, objectives are often most efficiently

secured by a single Service and require Service-specific planning. Naval operation planning, however, whether at the strategic, operational or tactical level, is always accomplished within the Joint Planning and Execution Community in support of national objectives and is therefore ultimately "joint" in nature.

CHAPTER THREE

THE METHODOLOGY

In all military matters the ability to distinguish between the essential, the desirable, and the trivial is a vital characteristic of clear thinking. . . . Character and experience give one the intuitive tools to make this distinction. An understanding of theory, training in logic, in semantic accuracy, and in analyzing objectives, gives one the analytical tools.

— Henry E. Eccles,
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy

Very few things are held in higher regard in the U.S. Naval Service than a commander's judgment, and there is no system, process or check-list that can replace it. Sometimes the solution to a military problem is as simple as having the commander, or a member of his staff, recognize the similarities between the current and previously encountered problems. Often the solutions are intuitive. The most seasoned, capable officers, however, are usually the quickest to recognize situations where it is helpful to have a systematic method of focusing and framing their own and their subordinates' problem-solving efforts. In this chapter several methods will be reviewed, and these specific questions will be discussed:

What are the characteristics and procedures of the Deliberate Planning and Crisis Action Planning Processes?

What are the characteristics and procedures of the Naval Planning and Decision-making Process?


How does the Naval Planning and Decision-making Process interact with the Deliberate Planning and Crisis Action Planning Processes?

THE JOINT OPERATION PLANNING PROCESSES

By establishing certain methods and procedures for focusing and framing the effort to solve a military problem, we create **planning processes**. While the Military Planning Logic discussed in Chapter One is common to almost all military problem-solving, specific processes have been designed to address the details of different types of problems. The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System prescribes two distinct processes for strategic/operational-level planning: The Deliberate Planning Process and the Crisis Action Planning Process.


The Deliberate Planning Process. Deliberate planning takes place prior to an actual crisis and involves the participation of the entire Joint Planning and Execution Community in a continuous, coordinated planning effort to counter potential threats with available resources. The deliberate planning cycle usually begins with the publication of the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan and terminates at the end of the period to which the JSCP applies, and is accomplished in five phases: **initiation, concept development, plan development, plan review, and supporting plans**. (See Figure 3.1)

Concept Development. The concept development phase is conducted in six steps: the assigned task is analyzed and the mission derived; the commander's planning guidance is issued; staff estimates are prepared to develop and analyze feasible COAs; the commander's estimate summarizes the first three steps and produces a decision as to the preferred COA; the selected COA is then expanded into the concept of operations; and finally the CINC's concept is reviewed by the Chairman, JCS. (See Figure 3.2)



Plan Development. Once approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), the concept of operations is expanded into a complete OPLAN during the plan development phase. The supported commander guides the plan development phase by publishing a Letter of Instruction (LOI) to coordinate the activities of the

numerous commands and agencies involved. Eight steps (see Figure 3.3) provide a logical planning structure within which the forces and resources required to execute the concept of operations are progressively identified, sequenced, and coupled with transportation capabilities to produce a feasible OPLAN. This phase of deliberate planning is heavily dependent on JOPES Automatic Data Processing (ADP) to produce the Time-Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD).¹



Plan Review. In the plan review phase of deliberate planning, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff conducts a final review of OPLANs submitted by the supported commander. The Chairman, in coordination with other members of the Joint

1. One of the most time-consuming and critical aspects of plan development is constructing the OPLAN TPFDD. A TPFDD is the computer-supported data base portion of an OPLAN dealing with the logistics of force deployment; the movement of forces and equipment required to execute the OPLAN. See Joint Pub 5-0, p. III-6 for further discussion.

Chiefs of Staff, the Services and Defense agencies, assesses and validates joint OPLANs using the criteria of adequacy, feasibility, acceptability, and consistency with joint doctrine. The review also identifies unresolved shortfalls in force and resource availability. Approved plans remain so until superseded, cancelled or implemented. Upon approval, the supported commander directs completion of supporting plans by subordinate and supporting commanders.

Supporting Plans. These plans focus on the mobilization, deployment, employment, and redeployment of forces and resources in support of the approved OPLAN concept of operations. They are developed by Service component commanders, JTF commanders, supporting commanders, and other agencies as directed by the supported commander. Employment planning is normally accomplished (under the guidance and supervision of the supported commander) by the subordinate commands which will direct the forces if the plan is implemented.

The Crisis Action Planning Process. A crisis is defined within the context of joint operation planning and execution as an incident or situation involving a threat to the United States, its territories, citizens, military forces, possessions, or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, political, or military importance that commitment of U.S. military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national objectives.²


An adequate and feasible military response to a crisis demands a flexible

2. Joint Pub 5-0, p. GL-8

adaptation of the Deliberate Planning Process that emphasizes time available, rapid and effective communications, and the use of previously accomplished contingency planning whenever possible. The Crisis Action Planning Process provides for the timely and precise exchange of information and analysis, the rapid preparation of military COAs for consideration by the National Command Authorities, and the prompt transmission of NCA decisions to supported commanders.

Crisis action planning and execution is accomplished within a flexible framework of six phases. (See Figure 3.4) These six phases integrate the workings of the National Command Authorities and the rest of the Joint Planning and Execution Community into a single unified process that sequentially provides for the identification of a situation potentially requiring a military response, the assessment of the requirement and formulation of strategy, the development of feasible COAs, the selection of a COA by the NCA, and when directed, implementation of the approved COA by the supported commander.

Situation Development. During the initial phase of crisis action planning, events that have potential national security implications are detected, reported, and assessed to determine whether a military response may be required. The combatant commander responsible for the theater in which the crisis occurs becomes the supported commander. If time sensitivity of the situation is such that normal CAP procedures cannot be followed, the commander's assessment may also include a recommended COA and serve as the commander's estimate, normally prepared in Phase III.



The situation development phase ends when the supported commander submits his assessment to the CJCS and NCA.

Crisis Assessment. During this phase of the crisis, the NCA, Chairman and other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff analyze the situation through available intelligence and determine whether a military option should be prepared. Beginning with the supported commander's report and assessment of the event, this phase is characterized by increased information and intelligence gathering, NCA review of options, and preparatory action by the Joint Planning and Execution Community. The flexibility of the Crisis Action Planning Process provides the latitude for the NCA to remain in this phase pending additional information, return to the pre-crisis situation, or progress to the next phase. The crisis assessment phase ends with an

NCA decision to return to the pre-crisis situation or to have military options developed for consideration and possible use.

COA Development. This phase implements an NCA decision or CJCS planning directive to develop military options. Normally, the directive will be a CJCS WARNING ORDER, but other CAP-prescribed orders may be used if the nature and timing of the crisis mandate acceleration of the planning. The supported commander develops and analyzes COAs and submits his recommendations to the NCA and CJCS in the form of an estimate of the situation. The COA development phase ends with the submission of the supported commander's estimate of the situation.

COA Selection. The Chairman, in consultation with the other Joint Chiefs, reviews the supported commander's estimate and advises the NCA. The NCA select a course of action and direct that execution planning begin. A CJCS ALERT ORDER is the formal method for notifying the supported commander and the JPEC of the selected COA and to initiate execution planning.

Execution Planning. The selected COA is converted into an OPORD during the execution planning phase. Actual forces, sustainment, and strategic mobility resources are identified and the concept of operations is described in OPORD format. The supported commander develops the OPORD and supporting TPFDD by modifying an existing OPLAN, expanding an existing CONPLAN, or developing a new plan. The execution planning phase terminates with an NCA decision to implement the OPORD, or, in those cases where the crisis does not progress to implementation, when the CJCS provides guidance regarding continued planning under either crisis action

or deliberate planning procedures. If the NCA decides to execute the OPORD, crisis action planning enters its final phase.

Execution. Beginning with the execute decision by the NCA, a military response is implemented and operations conducted by the supported commander until the crisis is resolved. CJCS, with authorization from the Secretary of Defense, issues a CJCS EXECUTE ORDER directing the deployment and employment of forces, defining the timing for the initiation of operations, and conveying guidance as required. If the crisis is prolonged, the process may be repeated continuously as circumstances change and missions are revised.


THE NAVAL PLANNING AND DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

Through the Deliberate Planning or Crisis Action Planning Process, a joint force commander identifies specific naval missions and responsibilities to be completed by a naval force commander. In order to minimize risk and ensure successful completion of his mission, the naval component commander prepares his own plan for his subordinate commanders. Subordinate naval commanders, in turn, prepare their plans to complete their assigned missions. Naval commanders utilize the Naval Planning and Decision-making Process (NPDP) to ensure the most efficient use of time to make the best decisions and produce the most comprehensive plan, while ensuring that no reasonable option is left inadvertently unexplored.

As missions filter down from higher echelons to the tactical level, planning requirements change from orchestrating and positioning the total force to employment


of individual units. The Naval Planning and Decision-making Process provides a logical framework to aid commanders and staff officers in solving the specific naval problems associated with maritime forces employment.

The actual formats and steps of the Naval Planning and Decision-making Process have evolved somewhat differently in the Navy and Marine Corps, due to the specifics of Navy and Marine operations, but each service covers essentially the same points in approximately the same order. The Navy version separates the steps into phases, while the Marine version is a sequential listing of fifteen steps referred to as "the sequence of command and staff action." (See Figure 3.5)




Navy Steps of NPDP. The first, or estimate, phase of the Navy version, prescribes seven steps to arrive at a decision on the course of action to be taken. The second, or planning, phase adds an additional eight steps dedicated to preparing the plan. The last two phases are the issuance of the directive and supervision of the planned action.

The Estimate of the Situation. During this phase the Navy commander closely analyzes his mission and decides on a course of action. (Figure 3.6) This "decision-making" phase is often referred to as a "process" in and of itself.³ It provides the commander a structured method of arriving at a logical decision concerning the selection of the best course of action.



3. The Estimate of the Situation and The Commander's Estimate of the Situation are often used interchangeably. They are also both referred to as **planning process**, as well as **phases** and **products** of planning processes. To reduce confusion NDP-5 will utilize the former phrase to identify the **phase** of planning and the latter to annotate the associated document, or **product**, that the commander utilizes to articulate his course of action decision.

Development of Detailed Plans. Once the course of action has been selected, the commander's staff begins detailed planning for its implementation. (Figure 3.7) The commander delineates subordinate commander tasks, responsibilities and command relationships, while his staff irons out the details of logistics, administration, communication and command and control in sufficient depth to ensure the selected course of action is executed with minimum losses to friendly forces. This phase ends when the commander approves the plan.



Preparation of the Directive. Once approved, the directive is prepared, and when released, initiates the planned action by communicating the commander's intentions to his subordinates. The format of the directive may vary depending on the situation and whether or not the plan was distributed separately.


Supervision of the Planned Action. Once the directive is issued, the commander and his staff closely supervise the execution of the planned action and revise the plan as required for mission accomplishment. This phase provides feedback that loops into the planning process at any point. If the original plan is thorough, and based on sound reasoning and assumptions, it can be modified as required during this phase of the planning process with a minimum of confusion.

Marine Steps of NPDP. The Marine version of the Naval Planning and Decision-making Process is a sequential listing of fifteen steps referred to as "the sequence of command and staff action." Each step is identified as either a "commander" or "staff" responsibility, but emphasis is placed on constant commander/staff interaction. Depending on the situation, individual steps may be performed out of sequence and/or simultaneously; steps signifying an end to a NPDP phase (see figure 3.5), however, are normally completed prior to moving to the next phase.

Steps 1 through 9. As illustrated in Figure 3.8, these are the decision-making steps in the Marine version. The end product is the "commander's decision" as to the best course of action.

Figure 3.8


**Naval Planning and Decision-Making Process
Estimate of the Situation
MARINE CORPS STEPS:**



Steps 10 through 13. Based on the decision from the previous phase, the commander briefs his concept of operations, issues warning orders to subordinates as required and works closely with all staff sections as they develop the detailed operation plan. The commander's approval of the plan is the final step in this phase. (See Figure 3.9)

Step 14. Once the commander approves the plan, he issues it to subordinates as is for further planning and preparation, or as an order to initiate execution.

Step 15. As in the Navy steps, this is the crucial phase where the commander and his staff monitor the execution of directives and adjust or modify the plan as the situation develops. Adequate and timely supervision is an essential contribution to mission accomplishment.



PROCESS INTERACTION

As mentioned earlier, U. S. military strength is founded on deliberate peacetime contingency planning. The Crisis Action Planning Process, however, provides the basic steps necessary for the rapid transition from peace to war or operations other than war. The Deliberate Planning Process supports crisis action planning by anticipating potential crises and developing plans that facilitate the timely selection of a course of action and execution planning during a crisis. If existing OPLANs, CONPLANs or Functional Plans are determined to be applicable to the situation, they can be expanded or modified as required. As the crisis unfolds, assumptions and projections are replaced by facts and actual conditions. Crisis action planning, therefore, is based on deliberate contingency planning whenever possible.

Campaign planning. Although not a structured planning process like the Deliberate Planning and Crisis Action Planning Processes, if the scope of contemplated operations requires it, campaign planning begins with or during deliberate planning and continues through crisis action planning. Campaign planning can facilitate the transition from peace to war or operations other than war by identifying (during peacetime) sequential or simultaneous operations that may be necessary to defeat a given threat during war. Campaign plans embody the combatant commander's vision of the arrangement of related major operations necessary to attain strategic objectives. The campaign plan enables combatant commanders to: describe expanded operational concepts for arranging a series of related military operations (air, ground, maritime, space, and SOF); organize forces; and assign tasks to synchronize the series of related operations.

Throughout campaign, deliberate and crisis action planning, the Naval Planning and Decision-making Process guides naval commanders and staff officers so that they can provide accurate and timely decisions and supporting plans to the joint force commander. During the Concept Development and Plan Development phases of the Deliberate Planning Process and during the Course of Action Development phase of the Crisis Action Planning Process, naval force commanders provide joint force commanders advice on how to employ naval forces most effectively and efficiently. (Figure 3.10 and figure 3.11) During the Supporting Plans phase of deliberate planning and the Execution Phase of crisis action planning, naval component commanders are assigned tasks requiring development of their own plans, which satisfy the

CHAPTER FOUR

PLANNING PRODUCTS

Joint force commanders should scrupulously avoid overly detailed management and direction. Simple orders with the intent of the commander clearly articulated comprise the best basis for clear and effective communications between and among all elements of the joint force.

— Joint Pub 1,
Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces

While previous chapters have discussed the processes and procedures used by naval planners in both maritime and joint operations, it is also important to emphasize the various products of these processes. By focusing on the visible results of deliberate, crisis action and naval planning, we can better understand the total planning effort and how it affects the average Navy and Marine Corps officer. The specific questions discussed in this chapter are:

What are the products of the different planning processes?

What is the basic format of the planning products?

During non-crisis situations, the preplanned response to a potential threat to national security may be specified in an operation plan (OPLAN), a concept plan (CONPLAN) or a functional plan developed by a supported combatant commander during the Deliberate Planning Process. In times of crisis, up to and including combat operations, crisis action planning produces operation orders (OPORDs), a directive issued to subordinate commanders for the purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation.

DELIBERATE PLANNING PRODUCTS

There are several key products of the Deliberate Planning Process which are the basis for the naval operation planning efforts. The supported combatant commander's mission statement and subsequent planning directive or conference are the starting points for the naval component commander's estimate of the situation. The CINC's COA and concept of operations (with its included commander's intent) provide his desired result of the planned action, otherwise known as the "end state." While the concept of operations delineates the joint force commander's estimated sequence of actions to achieve this end state, it may change as the resulting action is evaluated after execution begins. What does not change is the intent, or the "what", of the action. This allows subordinates to focus on the end state and encourages flexibility and initiative in determining their course of action and concept of operations.

The "Execution" section of the JOPES Basic Plan format¹, produced during Phase IV of the deliberate planning process, provides the joint force commander's concept of operations and commander's intent, which form the basis for all subsequent naval planning. Subsequent naval planning necessarily includes the commander's concept of operations and intent at each echelon. Centralized planning and decentralized execution, a common characteristic of U. S. Military operations, is dependent on the commanders' concept and intent being understood two levels up and down the chain of command.

1. Joint Publication 5-03.2, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, Volume II, Supplemental Planning Formats and Guidance, contains the format for plans produced during the JOPES-directed deliberate planning process. The "Basic Plan" format is standard for all plans and strategic concepts. Volume II also contains formats for annexes and appendices that would be added to the basic plan as required.

The basic OPLAN/OPORDER formats for Navy (Annex A) and Marine (Annex B) operations provide the method for the continued promulgation of this key information to subordinates. They ensure the unity of effort and synchronization of action necessary for mission accomplishment. The means of coordinating and controlling the execution of the selected course of action is the basic *five paragraph plan/order*.²

1. Situation
2. Mission
3. Execution
4. Administration and Logistics
5. Command and Control

Paragraphs 2, 3 and 5 provide both the "what" that is to be accomplished and the authority and responsibility to achieve it. The *art* in producing the plan is in ensuring that it meets the superior's stated mission and intent, while clearly conveying one's own mission and intent without inhibiting subordinate initiative, command authority and responsibility.

The final analysis of the thoroughness and clarity of the planning effort can only be measured when the deliberate plan (or portions thereof) is executed during a crisis. As was pointed out in a recent post-war analysis, Operation DESERT SHIELD is the most recent confirmation of the value of deliberate planning:

The success of the plan once put into action emphasized the value of detailed, deliberate planning. The concept was thoroughly gamed and analyzed. . . . As a result, options for solving those situations were well thought through and ready for

2. OPLANs, CONPLANs, and Functional Plans vary in the amount of detail required (Annexes and Appendices) and the purpose for which they were produced. These different types of deliberate plans are discussed further in Joint Publication 5-0, NWP-11, and FMFM 3-1. All three types of plans contain the information found in the 5 paragraphs of the "basic plan" format.

*presentation to decision makers without delay.*³

CRISIS ACTION PLANNING PRODUCTS

Throughout the history of the United States, forward deployed Navy and Marine forces have often been the first of our Armed Forces committed in times of crisis. But, there are crucial steps between asking "where are the carriers and the Marines?" to actual execution of the NCA directed task/mission: namely, determining the mission and planning for its completion and the completion of other stated or implied tasks.

The Crisis Action Planning Process provides the basic steps necessary to transition from peacetime operations to war or operations other than war. Updated intelligence or actual enemy actions will remove some of the ambiguity associated with the assumptions the Deliberate Planning Process, but do not necessarily preclude use of all or part of previously developed plans. The key in determining what is still valid will be the commander's estimate of the situation and the development of COAs. If existing OPLANs, CONPLANs, or Functional Plans are determined to be applicable to the situation, they can be expanded or modified for execution as an OPORD or Campaign Plan. If no plan exists that addresses the specific crisis under consideration, crisis action procedures - similar to deliberate planning but compressed in time - will be used by the JPEC to assist the supported CINC in the development of an appropriate OPORD and/or campaign plan.

One of the main differences between deliberate and crisis action planning is that the latter implies the inherent possibility of immediate military action which necessitates the

3. Douglas W. Craft, "An Operational Analysis of the Persian Gulf War," Strategic Studies Institute, August 31, 1992, p. 18.

addition of the sixth, or Execution Phase, of the Crisis Action Planning Process, with a specific set of products (directives) to initiate that action following NCA selection of a military COA. In developing COAs, the supported commander will consult with and task the commanders of subordinate components.

If time permits, the Service component commands will develop the Service aspects of the concept, determine force and resource requirements, and build TPFFD files to implement appropriate concepts.⁴ This interaction with naval planners is a key concept which is necessary to (1) enable decentralized execution after centralized planning has ensured unity of effort; (2) to maintain the tactical and operational integrity of Service organizations; and (3) to allow appropriate logistic and administrative support via Service commands.

Crisis action planning is initiated following recognition of an event having possible national security implications. The event is reported normally by a CINC but can be reported by any unit via message traffic utilizing report formats contained in *OPNAVINST 3100.6*.⁵ The CINC's component commanders are normally addressees on these messages and use them as cues to begin development of their commander's estimate of the situation. Key items to be initially evaluated are available forces in the AOR or theater and logistic support immediately available.

During Phase II, or assessment, phase of the Crisis Action Planning Process, the CINC continues increased reporting to aid the NCA/CJCS evaluation of the situation. Planning continues at the CINC, component and Service levels considering key issues such as

4. Joint Publication 5-03.1, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Volume I (Planning Policies and Procedures), pp. V-3 and V-4.

5. Detailed instructions for crisis reporting are provided in Joint Publications 1-03.6, 1-03.8, and 1-03.15.

the disposition of assigned and available forces, transportation assets, readiness and sustainability, and potential reserve component requirements. Initiation of the naval component commanders' estimate of the situation at first indication of a crisis is necessary because time sensitivity of some situations may require the CINC to provide recommended COA(s) in his initial assessment report vice during Phase III, COA Development.

Phase III begins with the NCA decision to develop military options and the CJCS issuance of the WARNING ORDER. The supported CINC then constructs COA(s) and tasks component commands to evaluate proposed COA(s) by releasing an EVALUATION REQUEST MESSAGE prior to submitting his Commander's Estimate of the Situation to the CJCS. Component commanders and the Services continue deployment and sustainment planning for combat, combat support, and combat service support units. Additionally, the component commanders continue to refine their own Commander's Estimate of the Situation and COAs.

During Phase IV, the CJCS, in consultation with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reviews and evaluates the CINC's Estimate of the Situation; the CJCS then advises the NCA on possible COA(s) for execution. It should be noted that at any time during crisis action planning, the CJCS, responding to time-sensitive situations, may issue a PLANNING ORDER which initiates execution planning activities (Phase V) prior to NCA selection of COA(s). Normally, the NCA selects the COA(s) and issues the ALERT ORDER which describes the selected COA(s) in sufficient detail to allow the supported CINC and other members of the JPEC to begin the detailed planning required to deploy and employ forces.

During this portion of crisis action planning, the NCA may also choose to issue a DEPLOYMENT PREPARATION or DEPLOYMENT ORDER to increase the deployability posture, position forces, or take other preparatory action to both signal U.S. resolve and increase military capability in the AOR should the crisis escalate to armed conflict. Throughout this phase, the naval component commander(s) work with the supported CINC and the Services to coordinate force generation, movement and sustainment.

The ALERT ORDER or PLANNING ORDER initiates Phase V, Execution Planning. During this phase the supported CINC converts the approved COA into an OPORD. Its purpose is to provide components, supporting commands, Services, and agencies detailed information and to task those involved to prepare for the operation. This OPORD provides the "what," the "who" and the authority to both plan for and execute (when directed) the NCA-directed mission. These are the essential items necessary for the naval component(s) to complete their OPORDs. The supported CINC also issues a TPFDD Letter of Instruction which provides for the coordination of deployment, replacement, and redeployment of forces necessary for the Services and component commands to logistically sustain the force.

Once the NCA decides, a CJCS EXECUTE ORDER directs the supported CINC to execute the OPORD. The CINC responds with a subsequent EXECUTE ORDER to his subordinate and supporting commanders. The CINC (or his designated joint task force commander) employs the assigned forces based on the concept of operations in the approved OPORD or, if necessary, a modified OPORD based on evaluation of ongoing operations.

Evaluation is based on operational or situation reports (SITREPs) specified in the

EXECUTE ORDER.⁶ Changes are normally coordinated with the NCA and transmitted to subordinate and supporting commands via specified message format. (See footnote 5.) Based on the level of change required, the change message can be either a fragmentary order (FRAGORDER) for small changes, normally to a particular Annex, or change order (CHANGEORDER) for significant changes, particularly to the concept of operations.

Dependent on the size, complexity and anticipated duration of military involvement, a CINC may also develop a campaign plan to synchronize related, simultaneous and sequential operations to accomplish strategic and operational objectives in the theater of operations. Campaign planning can be started during deliberate planning, but is normally completed during crisis action planning. Once the COA for an operation is determined, the CINC must consider whether the current operations will achieve the strategic and operational objective. If not, the CINC must begin planning for future operations. Planning for future operations includes estimates of the probable outcome of the current operations, which serve as a starting point for future operations. Thus changes in the campaign plan must be considered when changes to the OPORD are issued so that phasing and synchronization of operations is maintained.

NAVAL OPERATION PLANNING PRODUCTS

Naval Operation Plans provide the basis for coordination of naval component actions at the operational or tactical level in support of the theater CINC's concept of operations. They also advise the supported CINC as to the naval component commander's intended

6. Format for operational reporting will be as specified in the EXECUTE ORDER or OPORD. Normally the reports will be as prescribed in Joint Publication 1-03.8 and 6-04.

COA(s). This provide a means for the CINC to evaluate and coordinate naval component actions with other subordinate supporting and functional plans.

Directives are communications which initiate or govern action, conduct, or procedure. During naval planning and operations, they are used to establish policy or to order or modify a specific action. Plans developed and issued by either the deliberate planning or the crisis action planning processes are also directives. Directives can be transmitted either orally or in written format; but whatever the means of transmission, they must be clear, concise, complete and authoritative. Since directives are normally used to communicate the decisions made during the commander's estimate of the situation and subsequent plan development, they should clearly convey the commanders intent and concept of operations.

At the component (NAVFOR/MARFOR) and numbered Fleet/Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) level, Navy and Marine Corps directives are similar to those used by a CJTF, theater CINC or the NCA. These directives take the form of WARNING/ALERT/PLANNING/EXECUTE ORDERs, OPLANs, CONPLANs, Functional Plans, Campaign Plans and Letters of Instruction, and have been discussed in the preceding sections and chapters.

At the naval Task Force/Task Group and Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) level the directives take a different form because the operations focus on the tactical level of individual battles and engagements. At this level fighting forces are best directed by mission-type orders that specify the "what" while relying on the initiative and leadership of their commanders to provide the "how." Accordingly, the directives rely on preplanned actions based on the organization and training of our fighting forces. They are intended to establish

command authority and responsibility, and provide sufficient mission and situational awareness to help shape future courses of action at the tactical level while remaining succinct and definitive.

Operational General Matters (OPGEN) and *Operational Tasking (OPTASK)* are the types of message formats used by the Navy to convey or report operational instructions and information. An OPGEN covers matters of policy, instructions and information common to all forms of warfare, and detailed instructions for warfare responsibilities retained by the officer in tactical command (OTC). An OPTASK contains detailed information for specific aspects within individual areas of warfare (e.g. Anti-Submarine Warfare, Strike Warfare, etc.), and is also utilized for the tasking of specific resources. With Navy-wide standardization of the standing OPGEN and OPTASKs,⁷ officers in tactical command (OTCs) have the ability to rapidly integrate naval units into a synchronized Battle Force/Battle Group whether conducting operations in the littorals or in the open ocean. The OTC knows that his unit and composite warfare commanders, regardless of home fleet, have a common concept of operations and understanding of command and control measures. The OTC retains the freedom to modify these directives using supplements based on the specific area of operations, mission and threat. This system of OPGENs and OPTASKS covers the same basic elements as the OPORD — Situation/ Mission/Execution/Admin/Command and Control — that are necessary for centralized planning and decentralized execution in the strategic and operational planning systems.

7. OPGENs and OPTASKs are also used during multinational operations with NATO alliance maritime forces. ATP-1 and APP-4 provide details on NATO formats and procedures at the TF/TG level. To increase ease of interoperability with NATO forces, the two systems have been standardized to the maximum extent possible.

Marine forces have traditionally focused on mission-type orders, specifically, the *Five Paragraph Order*. Key issues are timeliness, simplicity and brevity, completeness, and flexibility. Combat orders (directives) are transmitted by verbal, written and graphic means. As required, individual unit commanders may be issued appropriate Annexes of the OPORD or the entire OPORD, but the essential element of the combat order is the mission. Once the mission is thoroughly understood, the standard Five Paragraph Order is often replaced with *Fragmentary Orders (FRAGORDERS)* addressing only specific changes or updates to the basic order.

In OPORDs, frequent references are made to Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), which prescribe procedures to be followed in the absence of instructions to the contrary, but these SOPs are not intended to inhibit initiative in execution of the assigned mission. The "how" is determined by the commander of the tasked unit.

If the ongoing commander's estimate of the situation determines that changes in the OPORD/OPGEN/OPTASK are required, that information is transmitted via FRAGORDER (USMC) or Supplements to the OPGEN/OPTASK (USN). Although the forces, command and control, administration and logistics, phasing and synchronization may change, the focus should remain on the desired "end state" driven by the strategic and operational objectives of the theater CINC.

In summary, the visible products of the various planning processes are *plans* and *directives*. They may take several different forms: the singular imperative, however, is that they be clear, concise, complete and authoritative. Experience has shown that simplicity and

clarity of the plan are essential for success in complex operations.

Once the supported commander selects a course of action, and formulates his commander's intent which conveys his desired "end state" for the action, detailed planning is completed and subordinates are assigned missions, tasks and objectives. The art in issuing directives to subordinates is in stating the "what" that is to be accomplished (the mission) while appropriately delegating the authority and responsibility to determine the "how."

The basic elements of the OPORD — Situation, Mission, Execution, Administration and Logistics, and Command and Control — provide the guidance necessary to achieve the proper balance between coordinating the action and allowing subordinate commanders to exercise their inherent command authority, tactical proficiency, and initiative to complete assigned missions.

CONCLUSION

Planning is an inherent function of command and so fundamental to all military operations that it is tempting to afford the discipline of planning less consideration than it deserves. NDP-5 provides the basic building blocks and common starting point from which to examine how naval commanders and staff officers should plan. Only with a firm grasp of the fundamentals of planning, the related processes and products, and a clear, conceptual view of United States military planning structure can we fully examine and understand naval planning in context of modern warfare.

At the strategic and operational level of war, the Joint Operations Planning and Execution System aids commanders in translating strategic direction into military actions. The procedures and guidelines set forth in JOPES doctrinal manuals are applicable to maritime, air and ground forces alike. At the tactical level, however, the details of employing combat units require a specifically tailored planning process for flexible decision-making and command and staff action.

The Naval Planning and Decision-making Process provides the common logical framework within which naval commanders and staff officers can analyze their mission, evaluate the situation, decide on the best course of action, translate the decision into planned subordinate action, and monitor and modify the planned action as required. Although actual procedures and specific steps vary slightly, the NPDP is common to both the Navy and Marine Corps.

NDP-5 has introduced the reader to **Naval Planning**, from the simplest "direct-ed thinking" problem, to how and where it fits into the development of the complex network of formal OPLANS and Crisis Action Plans. As a capstone publication, it is intended to **begin** the discussion on naval planning. More detailed discussions, and specifics on "how to" develop plans can be found in NWP-11, Naval Operational Planning and FMFM 3-1, Command and Staff Action.

Nothing warfighters do in peacetime is more important than planning for war. The success of NDP-5 will be measured by the extent to which naval planning occupies the forefront of our peacetime preparations, discussions and education.

GLOSSARY ¹

acceptability. Operation plan review criterion. The determination whether the contemplated course of action is worth the cost in manpower, material, and time involved; is consistent with the law of war; and militarily and politically supportable. (Joint Pub 1-02)

adequacy. Operation plan review criterion. The determination whether the scope and concept of a planned operation are sufficient to accomplish the task assigned. (Pub 1-02)

alert order. 1. A crisis-action planning directive from the Secretary of Defense, issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that provides essential guidance for planning and directs the initiation of execution planning for the selected course of action authorized by the Secretary of Defense. 2. A planning directive that provides essential planning guidance and directs the initiation of execution planning after the directing authority approves a military course of action. An alert order does not authorize execution of the approved course of action.

alliance. An alliance is established through formal agreements (i.e., treaties) between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives which further the common interests of the members.

allocation. In a general sense, distribution of limited resources among competing requirements for employment. Specific allocations (e.g., air sorties, nuclear weapons, forces, and transportation) are described as allocation of air sorties, nuclear weapons, etc. (Joint Pub 1-02)

apportionment. In the general sense, distribution for planning of limited resources among competing requirements. Specific apportionments (e.g., air sorties and forces for planning) are described as apportionment of air sorties and forces for planning etc. (Joint Pub 1-02)

area of operations. An operational area defined by the joint force commander for land and naval forces. Areas of operation do not typically encompass the entire operational area of the joint force commander, but should be large enough for component

1. Definitions come from Joint Pub 5-0 unless otherwise noted.

commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces.

augmentation forces. Forces to be transferred from a supporting commander to the combatant command (command authority) or operational control of a supported commander during the execution of an operation order approved by the National Command Authorities.

campaign. A series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. (Joint Pub 1-02)

campaign planning. The process whereby combatant commanders and subordinate joint force commanders translate national or theater strategy into operational concepts through the development of campaign plans. Campaign planning may begin during deliberate planning when the actual threat, national guidance, and available resources become evident, but is normally not completed until after the National Command Authorities select the course of action during crisis action planning. Campaign planning is conducted when contemplated military operations exceed the scope of a single major joint operation.

campaign plan. A plan for a series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Chairman's Preparedness Assessment Report. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's preparedness assessment report (PAR) advises the Secretary of Defense on the preparedness of the combatant commands to carry out assigned missions by identifying critical deficiencies and strengths in force capabilities and logistics. Primary input for the PAR is from the CINC's Preparedness Assessment Reports. Also called PAR.

CINC's strategic concept. Final document produced in Step 5 of the concept development phase of the deliberate planning process. The CINC's Strategic Concept is used as the vehicle to distribute the CINC's decision and planning guidance for accomplishing joint strategic capabilities plan or other Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) taskings. CJCS approval of the strategic concept becomes the basis of the plan for development into an operation plan or operation plan in concept format. Formerly called "the concept of operations." Also called CSC.

coalition. An ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action.

combatant command. A unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Combatant commands typically have geographic or functional responsibilities.

combatant command (command authority). Nontransferable command authority established by title 10, United States Code, section 164, exercised only by commanders of unified or specified combatant commands unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Combatant command (command authority) is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. Combatant command (command authority) should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations; normally, this authority is exercised through the Service or functional component commander. Combatant command (command authority) provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the combatant commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Also called COCOM. (Joint Pub 1-02)

combatant commander. A commander in chief (CINC) of one of the unified or specified combatant commands established by the President. (Joint Pub 1-02)

commander's estimate of the situation. A logical process of reasoning by which a commander considers all the circumstances affecting the military situation and arrives at a decision as to a course of action to be taken to accomplish the mission. A commander's estimate which considers a military situation so far in the future as to require major assumptions is called a commander's long-range estimate of the situation. (Joint Pub 102)

concept of operations. A verbal or graphic statement, in broad outline, of a commander's assumptions or intent in regard to an operation or series of operations. The concept of operations frequently is embodied in campaign plans and operation plans; in the latter case, particularly when the plans cover a series of connected operations to be carried out simultaneously or in succession. The concept is designed to give an overall picture of the operation. It is included primarily for additional clarity of purpose. Also called commander's concept. (Joint Pub 1-02)

contingency. An emergency involving military forces caused by natural disasters, terrorists, subversives, or by required military operations. Due to the uncertainty of the situation, contingencies require plans, rapid response, and special procedures to ensure the safety and readiness of personnel, installations, and equipment. (Joint Pub 1-02)

contingency planning. The development of plans for potential crisis involving military requirements that can reasonably be expected in an area of responsibility. Contingency planning for joint operations is coordinated at the national level to support Secretary of Defense Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG) strategic requirements in the National Military Strategy and emerging crises. Contingency planning can occur anywhere within the range of military operations and may be performed deliberately or under crisis action conditions. Contingency planning for joint operations is coordinated at the national level by assigning planning tasks and relationships among the combatant commanders and apportioning or allocating forces and resources available to accomplish those tasks. Commanders throughout the unified chain of command may task their staffs and subordinate commands with additional contingency planning tasks beyond those specified at the national level to provide broader contingency coverage.

course of action. 1. A plan that would accomplish, or is related to, the accomplishment of a mission. 2. The scheme adopted to accomplish a task or mission. It is a product of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System concept development phase. The supported commander will include a recommended course of action in the commander's estimate. The recommended course of action will include the concept of operations, evaluation of supportability estimates of supporting organizations, and an integrated time-phased data base of combat, combat support, and combat service support forces and sustainment. Refinement of this data base will be contingent on the time available for course of action development. When approved, the course of action becomes the basis for the development of an operation plan or operation order. Also called COA. (Joint Pub 1-02)

course of action development. The phase of the Joint operation Planning and Execution System within the crisis action planning process that provides for the development of military responses and includes, within the limits of the time allowed: establishing force and sustainment requirements with actual units; evaluating force, logistic, and transportation feasibility; identifying and resolving resource shortfalls; recommending resource allocations; and producing a course of action via a commander's estimate that contains a concept of operations, employment concept, risk assessments, prioritized courses of action, and supporting data bases. (Joint Pub 1-02)

crisis. An incident or situation involving a threat to the United States, its territories, citizens, military forces, possessions, or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, political, or military importance that commitment of U.S. military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national objectives.

crisis action planning. 1. The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System process involving the time-sensitive development of joint operation plans and orders in response to an imminent crisis. Crisis action planning follows prescribed crisis action procedures to formulate and implement an effective response within the timeframe permitted by the crisis. 2. The time sensitive planning for the deployment, employment, and sustainment of assigned and allocated forces and resources that occurs in response to a situation that may result in actual military operations. Crisis action planners base their plan on the circumstances that exist at the time planning occurs. Also called CAP.

deliberate planning. 1. The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System process involving the development of joint operation plans for contingencies identified in joint strategic planning documents. Conducted principally in peacetime, deliberate planning is accomplished in prescribed cycles that complement other Department of Defense planning cycles in accordance with the formally established joint strategic planning system. 2. A planning process for the deployment and employment of apportioned forces and resources that occurs in response to a hypothetical situation. Deliberate planners rely heavily on assumptions regarding the circumstances that will exist when the plan is executed.

DEPLOYMENT ORDER. A planning directive from the Secretary of Defense, issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that authorizes and directs the transfer of forces between combatant commands by reassignment or attachment. A deployment order normally specifies the authority that the gaining combatant commander will exercise over the transferred forces.

deployment planning. Operational planning directed toward the movement of forces and sustainment resources from their original locations to a specific operational area for conducting the joint operations contemplated in a given plan. Encompasses all activities from origin or home station through destination, specifically including within the continental United States, intertheater, and intratheater movement legs, staging areas, and holding areas.

employment. The strategic, operational, or tactical use of forces.

employment planning. Planning that prescribes how to apply force/forces to attain specified military objectives. Employment planning concepts are developed by combatant commanders through their component commanders.

EXECUTE ORDER. 1. An order issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, by the authority and at the direction of the Secretary of Defense, to implement a National Command Authorities' decision to initiate military operations. 2. An order to initiate military operations as directed.

execution planning. The phase of the Joint operation Planning and Execution System crisis action planning process that provides for the translation of an approved course of action into an executable plan of action through the preparation of a complete operation plan or operation order. Execution planning is detailed planning for the commitment of specified forces and resources. During crisis action planning, an approved operation plan or other National Command Authorities-approved course of action is adjusted, refined, and translated into an operation order. Execution planning can proceed on the basis of prior deliberate planning, or it can take place in the absence of prior planning.

feasibility. Operation plan review criterion. The determination of whether the assigned tasks could be accomplished by using available resources. (Joint Pub 1-02)

force planning. Planning associated with the creation and maintenance of military capabilities. It is primarily the responsibility of the Military Departments and Services and is conducted under the administrative control that runs from the Secretary of Defense to the Military Departments and Services.

functional plans. Plans involving the conduct of military operations in a peacetime or permissive environment developed by combatant commanders to address requirements such as disaster relief, nation assistance, logistics, communications, surveillance, protection of US citizens, nuclear weapon recovery and evacuation, and continuity of operations, or similar discrete tasks. They may be developed in response to the requirements of the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, at the initiative of the CINC, or as tasked by the supported combatant commander, Joint Staff, Service, or Defense agency.

implementation planning. Operational planning associated with the conduct of a continuing operation, campaign, or war to attain defined objectives. At the national level, it includes the development of strategy and the assignment of strategic tasks to the combatant commanders. At the theater level, it includes the development of campaign plans to attain assigned objectives and the preparation of operation plans and

operation orders to prosecute the campaign. At lower levels, implementation planning prepares for the execution of assigned tasks or logistic missions. (Joint Pub 1-02)

intelligence. 1. The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign countries or areas. 2. Information and knowledge about an adversary obtained through observation, investigation, analysis, or understanding. (Joint Pub 1-02)

interoperability. 1. The ability of systems, units or forces to provide service to and accept services from other systems, units, or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together. 2. The condition achieved among communications-electronics systems or items of communications/electronics equipment when information or services can be exchanged directly and satisfactorily between them and/or their users. The degree of interoperability should be defined when referring to specific cases. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint force commander. A general term applied to a combatant commander, subunified commander, or joint task force commander authorized to exercise combatant command (command authority) or operational control over a joint force. Also called JFC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint operation. A general term to describe military actions conducted by joint forces, or by a Service force, in relationships (e.g. support, coordinating authority), which, of themselves, do not create joint forces. (Joint Pub 0-2).

joint operation planning. Planning for contingencies which can reasonably be anticipated in an area of responsibility or joint operations area of the command. Planning activities exclusively associated with the preparation of operation plans, operation plans in concept format, campaign plans, and operation orders (other than the single integrated operation plan) for the conduct of military operations by combatant commanders in response to requirements established by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Contingency planning for joint operations is coordinated at the national level to support Secretary of Defense Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG), strategic requirements in the National Military Strategy, and emerging crises. As such, joint operations planning includes mobilization planning, deployment planning, employment planning, sustainment planning, and redeployment planning procedures. Joint operations planning is performed in accordance with formally established planning and execution procedures.

joint operation planning process. A coordinated Joint Staff procedure used by a commander to determine the best method of accomplishing assigned tasks and to direct the action necessary to accomplish the mission. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Joint Operation Planning and Execution System. A continuously evolving system that develops, integrates and enhances earlier planning and execution systems: Joint Operation Planning System and Joint Deployment System. It provides the foundation for conventional command and control by national- and theater-level commanders and their staffs. It is designed to satisfy their information needs in the conduct of joint planning and operations. Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) includes joint operation planning policies, procedures, and reporting structures supported by communications and automated data processing systems. JOPES is used to monitor, plan, and execute mobilization, deployment, employment, and sustainment activities associated with joint operations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Joint Planning and Execution Community. Those headquarters, commands, and agencies involved in the training, preparation, movement, reception, employment, support, and sustainment of military forces assigned or committed to a theater of operations or objective area. It usually consists of the Joint Staff, Services, Service major commands (including the Service wholesale logistics commands), unified commands (and their Service component commands), subunified commands, transportation component commands, joint task forces (as applicable), Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), and other defense agencies (e.g., Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Central Imagery Office (CIO), Defense Information System Agency (DISA), Defense Mapping Agency (DMA), National Security Agency (NSA), and Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA)) as may be appropriate to a given scenario. Also called JPEC.

Joint Strategic Planning System. The primary means by which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in consultation with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and combatant commanders, carries out his statutory responsibilities to assist the President and Secretary of Defense in providing strategic direction to the Armed Forces; prepares strategic plans; prepares and reviews contingency plans; advises the President and Secretary of Defense on requirements, programs, and budgets; and provides net assessment on the capabilities of the Armed Forces of the United States and its allies as compared with those of their potential adversaries. Also called JSPS. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint task force. A force composed of assigned or attached elements of the Army, Navy, USMC, and Air Force, or two or more of these services, which is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense or the commander of a unified command, a specified command or an existing joint task force. Also known as JTF. (Joint Pub 1-02)

lines of operations. Lines which define the directional orientation of the force in time and space in relation to the enemy. They connect the force with its base of operations and its objectives.

mobilization. 1. The act of assembling and organizing national resources to support national objectives in time of war or other emergencies. 2. The process by which the Armed Forces or part of them are brought to a state of readiness for war or other national emergency. This includes activating all or part of the Reserve components as well as assembling and organizing personnel, supplies, and materiel. Mobilization of the Armed Forces includes but is not limited to the following categories:

- a. selective mobilization. Expansion of the active Armed Forces resulting from action by Congress and/or the President to mobilize Reserve component units, individual ready reservists, and the resources needed for their support to meet the requirements of a domestic emergency that is not the result of an enemy attack.
- b. partial mobilization. Expansion of the active Armed Forces resulting from action by Congress (up to full mobilization) or by the President (not more than 1,000,000 personnel) to mobilize Ready Reserve component units, individual reservists, and the resources needed for their support to meet the requirements of a war or other national emergency involving an external threat to the national security.
- c. full mobilization. Expansion of the active Armed Forces resulting from action by Congress and the President to mobilize all Reserve component units in the existing approved force structure, all individual reservists, retired military personnel, and the resources needed for their support to meet the requirements of a war or other national emergency involving an external threat to the national security.
- d. total mobilization. Expansion of the active Armed Forces resulting from action by Congress and the President to organize and/or generate additional units or personnel, beyond the existing force structure, and the resources needed for their support, to meet the total requirements of a war or other national emergency involving an external threat to the national security. (Joint Pub 1-02)

multinational operations. A collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, typically organized within the structure of a coalition or alliance. (Joint Pub 1-02).

National Command Authorities. The President and the Secretary of Defense or their duly deputized alternates or successors. Also called NCA. (Joint Pub 1-02)

operation. A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission; the process of carrying on combat, including movement, supply, attack, defense, and maneuvers needed to gain the objectives of any battle or campaign. (Joint Pub 1-02)

operational art. The employment of military forces to attain strategic and/or operational objectives through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations and battles. Operational art translates the joint force commander's strategy into operational design, and ultimately, tactical action, by integrating the key activities at all levels of war. (Joint Pub 1-02)

operational control. Transferable command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in Combatant Command (command authority) and is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations; normally, this authority is exercised through a joint force commander and Service component commanders. Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. Also called OPCON. (Joint Pub 1-02)

operational level of war. The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or areas of operations. Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives needed to accomplish the strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources to bring about and sustain these events. These activities imply a broader dimension of time or

space than do tactics; they ensure the logistic and administrative support of tactical forces, and provide the means by which tactical successes are exploited to achieve strategic objectives. (Joint Pub 1-02)

operation order. A directive issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose of affecting the coordinated execution of an operation. Also called OPOD. (Joint Pub 1-02)

operation plan. Any plan, except for the Single Integrated Operation Plan, for the conduct of military operations. Plans are prepared by combatant commanders in response to requirements established by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and by commanders of subordinate commands in response to requirements tasked by the establishing unified commander. Operation Plans are prepared in either a complete format (OPLAN) or as a concept plan (CONPLAN). The CONPLAN can be published with or without a time-phased force deployment data (TPFDD) file.

- a. OPLAN. An operation plan for the conduct of joint operations that can be used as a basis for development of an operation order (OPOD). An OPLAN identifies the forces and supplies required to execute the CINC's strategic concept and a movement schedule of these resources to the theater of operations. The forces and supplies are identified in TPFDD files. OPLANs will include all phases of the tasked operation. The plan is prepared with the appropriate annexes, appendices, and TPFDD files as described in the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System manuals containing planning policies, procedures, and formats.
- b. CONPLAN. An operation plan in an abbreviated format that requires considerable expansion or alteration to convert it into an OPLAN or OPOD. A CONPLAN contains the CINC's strategic concept and those annexes and appendices deemed necessary by the combatant commander to complete planning. Generally, detailed support requirements are not calculated and TPFDD files are not prepared.
- c. CONPLAN With TPFDD. A CONPLAN with TPFDD is the same as a CONPLAN except that it requires more detailed planning for phased deployment of forces. (Joint Pub 1-02)

planning order. 1. An order issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to initiate execution planning. The planning order will normally follow a commander's estimate and a planning order will normally take the place of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff alert order. The National Command Authorities' approval of a

selected course of action is not required before issuing a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff planning order. 2. A planning directive that provides essential planning guidance and directs the initiation of execution planning before the directing authority approves a military course of action.

shortfall. The lack of forces, equipment, personnel, materiel, or capability, reflected as the difference between the resources identified as a plan requirement and those apportioned to a combatant commander for planning, that would adversely affect the command's ability to accomplish its mission. (Joint Pub 1-02)

specified command. A command that has a broad, continuing mission, normally functional, and is established and so designated by the President through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

staff estimates. Assessments of courses of action by the various staff elements of a command that serve as the foundation of the commander's estimate. (Joint Pub 1-02)

strategic level of war. The level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) security objectives and guidance, and develops and uses national resources to accomplish these objectives. Activities at this level establish national and multinational military objectives; sequence initiatives; define limits and assess risks for the use of military and other instruments of power; develop global plans or theater war plans to achieve those objectives; and provide military forces and other capabilities in accordance with strategic plans. (Joint Pub 1-02)

strategic plan. A plan for the overall conduct of a war. (Joint Pub 1-02)

subordinate command. A command consisting of the commander and all those individuals, units, detachments, organizations, or installations that have been placed under the command by the authority establishing the subordinate command. (Joint Pub 1-02)

suitability. Naval operation plan review criterion. The determination whether the scope and concept of a planned operation are sufficient to accomplish the task assigned. (similar to the test for "adequacy") (NWP-11)

supported commander. The commander having primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan or other joint operation planning authority. In the context of joint operation planning, this term refers to the

commander who prepares operation plans or operation orders in response to requirements of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (Joint Pub 1-02)

supporting commander. A commander who provides augmentation forces or other support to a supported commander or who develops a supporting plan. Includes the designated combatant commands and defense agencies as appropriate. (Joint Pub 1-02) ,

supporting plan. An operation plan prepared by a supporting commander or a subordinate commander to satisfy the requests or requirements of the supported commander's plan. (Joint Pub 1-02)

sustainment. The provision of personnel, logistic, and other support required to maintain and prolong operations or combat until successful accomplishment or revision of the mission or of the national objective. (Joint Pub 1-02)

tactical level of war. The level of war at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces. Activities at this level focus on the ordered arrangement and maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other and to the enemy to achieve combat objectives. (Joint Pub 1-02)

theater commander. A combatant commander with a geographic area of responsibility assigned by the National Command Authorities.

theater of operations. A sub-area within a theater of war defined by the theater combatant commander required to conduct or support specific combat operations. Different theaters of operations within the same theater of war will normally be geographically separate and focused on different enemy forces. Theaters of operations are usually of significant size, allowing for operations over extended periods of time.

theater of war. Defined by the National Command Authorities or the theater combatant commander, the area of air, land, and water that is, or may become, directly involved in the conduct of the war. A theater of war does not normally encompass the theater combatant commander's entire area of responsibility and may contain more than one theater of operations.

theater strategy. The art and science of developing integrated strategic concepts and courses of action directed toward securing the objectives of national and alliance or coalition security policy and strategy by the use of force, threatened use of force, or operations not involving the use of force within a theater. (Joint Pub 1-02)

time-phased force and deployment data. The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System data base portion of an operation plan; it contains time-phased force data, non-unit-related cargo and personnel data, and movement data for the operation plan, including:

- a. In-place units.
- b. Units to be deployed to support the operation plan with a priority indicating the desired sequence for their arrival at the port of debarkation.
- c. Routing of forces to be deployed.
- d. Movement data associated with deploying forces.
- e. Estimates of non-unit-related cargo and personnel movements to be conducted concurrently with the deployment of forces.
- f. Estimate of transportation requirements that must be fulfilled by common-user lift resources, as well as those requirements that can be fulfilled by assigned or attached transportation resources. Also called TPFDD.

unified command. A command with broad continuing missions under a single commander and composed of forces from two or more Military Departments, and which is established by the President, through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Also called unified combatant command. (Joint Pub 1-02)

WARNING ORDER. 1. A crisis action planning directive issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that initiates the development and evaluation of courses of action by a supported commander and requests that a commander's estimate be submitted. 2. A planning directive that describes the situation, allocates forces and resources, establishes command relationships, provides other initial planning guidance, and initiates subordinate unit mission planning. 3. A preliminary notice of an order or action which is to follow. (Joint Pub 1-02.)

NAVY OPORDER IN MESSAGE FORMAT

DTG

FM CTF TWO ONE

TO TF TWO ONE

INFO CNO WASHINGTON DC

CINCLANTFLT NORFOLK VA

COMNAVSURFLANT NORFOLK VA

COMSECONDFLT

BT

CLASSIFICATION

MSGID/GENADMIN//

SUBJ/ COMCARGRU TWO OPORD 12-8X//

AMPN/USE OPERATIONS TIME ZONE PLUS TWO//

A. COMSECONDFLT LTR OF INST 0036-8X

RMKS/1. () **SITUATION.** ALLIED SHIPPING SUFFERING HEAVY LOSSES FROM ENEMY SUBS AND AIRCRAFT OPERATING FROM XRAY AND ZULU ISLAND. CINCLANTFLT DIRECTED CAPTURE ZULU ISLAND AND NEUTRALIZATION X RAY ISLAND. ENEMY FORCE CONSISTING OF CRUISERS AND DESTROYERS OBSERVED 1 MAY LAT 35 DEG NORTH LONG 20 DEG WEST. BEGINNING D-DAY JOINT AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE CONDUCTS AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT ON ZULU ISLAND. LAND BASED AIR CONDUCTS LONG RANGE RECC OF AREA OF OPERATIONS.

2. () **MISSION.** BEGINNING D MINUS FIVE DAYS, NEUTRALIZE ENEMY FORCES XRAY ISLAND. MISSION ORDER STATES TO ASSIST IN CAPTURE ZULU ISLAND.

3. () **EXECUTION.** THIS FORCE WILL BEGINNING D MINUS FIVE DAYS, DESTROY ENEMY NAVAL AND AIR BASE FACILITIES ON XRAY ISLAND AND FORCES BASED THEREON BY BOTH AIR AND SURFACE ACTION.

A.() TG 21.1 CARRIER STRIKING GROUP: COMCARGRU TWO, CARGRU TWO, WAINWRIGHT, TURNER, DESRON FOUR. DESTROY ENEMY AIR AND SURFACE FORCES AIR BASE FACILITIES ON XRAY ISLAND. PROTECT STRIKING AND COVERING GROUP FROM ENEMY AIRCRAFT.

B.() TG 21.2 STRIKING AND COVERING GROUP: COMCRUDESGRU FOUR, DALE, SOLAR, DESRON SIX, DESRON EIGHT. DESTROY NAVAL BASES AND COAST DEFENSES ON XRAY ISLAND. PROTECT CARRIER GROUP FROM ENEMY SURFACE FORCES.

X.() D-DAY IS DAY OF MAIN TROOP LANDING ZULU ISLAND. TENTATIVELY TWENTY MAY. PROVIDE GUNFIRE AND AIR SUPPORT FOR JATF WHEN DIRECTED BY CTF 21.

4. () **ADMIN-LOGISTICS.** REFUEL AND REPLENISH FROM UNDERWAY REPLENISHMENT FORCE AREA HEMLOCK.

5. () **COMMAND.** USE SECONDFLT COMPLAN SIX. COMMANDER STRIKING AND COVERING GROUP IN DALE SECOND IN COMMAND. COMMANDER STRIKING FORCE IN AMERICA. END OPORD.

6. () **ANNEXES** ALFA CONCEPT OF OPS ECHO CRUINST FORWARDED ACTION ADDEES BY GUARD MAIL//

USMC OPERATION PLAN/ORDER OUTLINE

Copy no. __ of __ copies
Issuing headquarters
PLACE OF ISSUE
Date/time of issue
Message reference number

_____ OPLAN (OPORD) _____

Ref:

Task Organization: Annex A

1. SITUATION

- a. General (operation plans only)
- b. Enemy
- c. Friendly
- d. Attachments and Detachments
- e. Assumptions (operation plans only)

2. MISSION

3. EXECUTION

- a. Concept of Operations
- b. Tasks
- c. Reserve
- d. Coordinating Instructions

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

- a. Concept of Support
- b. Logistics
- c. Personnel
- d. Coordinating Instructions

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

- a. Command Relationships
- b. Signal
- c. Command Posts

/s/ _____

ANNEXES:

A - TASK ORGANIZATION

B - INTELLIGENCE

Appendices:

- 1 - Essential Elements of Information
- 2 - Signals Intelligence
- 3 - Counterintelligence
- 4 - Target Intelligence
- 5 - Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy
- 6 - Human Source Intelligence
- 7 - Intelligence Estimate
- 8 - Tactical Study of Weather and Terrain
- 9 - Beach Study
- 10 - Helicopter Landing Zone/Drop Zone Study
- 11 - Surveillance and Reconnaissance Plan

C - OPERATIONS

Appendices:

- 1 - Nuclear Operations
- 2 - NBC Defense
- 3 - Electronic Warfare
- 4 - Psychological Operations
- 5 - Unconventional Warfare
- 6 - Search and Rescue
- 7 - Deception
- 8 - Rules of Engagement
- 9 - Reconnaissance
- 10 - Operations Overlay
- 11 - Concept of Operations
- 12 - Fire Support

D - LOGISTICS

Appendices:

- 1 - Petroleum, oils, and Lubricants Supply
- 2 - Mortuary Services
- 3 - Medical Services
- 4 - Mobility/Transportation
- 5 - Civil Engineering Support Plan
- 6 - Nonnuclear Ammunition

E - PERSONNEL

Appendices:

- 1 - Enemy Prisoners of War, Civilian Internees, and Other Detained Persons
- 2 - Processing of Formerly Captured, Missing, or Detained U.S.

F - PUBLIC AFFAIRS

G - CIVIL AFFAIRS

H - ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES

J - COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

K - COMMUNICATIONS / ELECTRONICS

Appendices:

1 - Communications Security

L - OPERATIONS SECURITY

M - AIR OPERATIONS

Appendices:

1 - Air Defense/Anti-air Warfare

2 - Air Support

3 - Assault Support

4 - Air Control

5 - Search and Rescue

6 - Armament

7 - Aircraft Schedules

8 - Air Communications

P - COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

Appendices:

1 - Concept of Combat Service Support

2 - CSS Overlay

3 - CSS Installations Defense Plan

4 - Reports and Records

R - AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS

Appendices:

1 - Advance Force Operations

2 - Embarkation Plan

3 - Landing Plan

4 - Rehearsal Plan

5 - Withdrawal Plan (omitted)

X - EXECUTION CHECKLIST

Z - DISTRIBUTION

SAMPLE OPERATION ORDER

(PRECEDENCE)

FROM: USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
TO: CJCS WASHINGTON DC
USACOM NORFOLK VA
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
USCINCSpace PETERSON AFB CO
USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM
USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL
USCINCSTRAT OFFUTT AFB NE
USCINCTrans SCOTT AFB IL
DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
INFO WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM WASHINGTON DC
SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
CSA WASHINGTON DC
CNO WASHINGTON DC
CSAF WASHINGTON DC
CMC WASHINGTON DC
CDRUSELNORAD PETERSON AFB CO
HQ AMC SCOTT AFB IL//CC//
CDRMTMC FALLS CHURCH VA
COMSC WASHINGTON DC
DISA WASHINGTON DC
DIA WASHINGTON DC
DLA CAMERON STATION VA
HQ DMA FAIRFAX VA
CIA WASHINGTON DC
CENTRAL IMAGERY OFFICE WASHINGTON DC
COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC
COMUSARCENT FT MCPHERSON GA
USCENTAF SHAW AFB SC//CC//
COMUSNAVCENT
CINCLANTFLT NORFOLK VA
CG FMFLANT
CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
CINCPACAF HICKAM AFB HI
CG FMFPAC
CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
HQ ACC LANGLEY AFB VA//CC//
CDRJCSE MACDILL AFB FL

ANNEX - C

CLASSIFICATION

OPER/BLUENOSE//

MSGID/ORDER/USCINCCENT//

AMPN/SPECIAL HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS//

REF/A/DOC/CJCS/211742ZNOV--//

REF/B/ORDER/CJCS/270300ZNOV--//

NARR/JOINT STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES PLAN (FY), CJCS ALERT ORDER//

ORDTYP/OPORD/USCINCCENT..XXX//

MAP/1015/BLUELAND//

MAP/1020/ORANGELAND//

NARR/SCALE 1:100,000//

TIMEZONE/Z//

HEADING/TASK ORGANIZATION//

5UNIT

/UNITDES /UNITLOC /CMNTS

/USCINCCENT /MACDILL AFB, FL

/USACOM /NORFOLK, VA

/USCINCEUR /VAIHINGEN, GE

/USCINCPAC /CAMP SMITH, HI

/USCINCTRANS /SCOTT AFB, IL /2 TACTICAL AIRLIFT

SQ, 6 KC-10

/USCINCSTRAT /OFFUTT AFB, NE 2 RC-135

/NSA/CSS

/HQ USCENTCOM FWD /(JTF 1000)

/HQ USARCENT (MINUS)

/1 ARMOR BDE (PLUS)

/1 INF BDE (M) (PLUS)

/1 PSYOP CO

/HQ USCENTAF (MINUS)

/1 TFW

/1 RESCUE WG

/1 RECON SQ

/4 E-3A (AWACS)

/HQ USNAVCENT (MINUS)

/SUPPORTING FORCES

/COMSUPNAVFOR

/ CTG 6 0. 1 (CVBG)

/15 MEB

/MPS

/VP SQDN (P-3)//

GENTEXT/SITUATION/

1. () INTERNAL STABILITY IN AND SECURITY OF BLUELAND AND ORANGELAND HAVE DETERIORATED BECAUSE OF CONTINUED

ANNEX - C

**YELLOWLAND SUPPORT OF THE REBEL FORCES SEEKING THE
OVERTHROW OF THE GOVERNMENT OF _____.**

**A. () ENEMY FORCES. SEE CURRENT SITREP AND DIN.
YELLOWLAND SUPPORTS INTERNAL INSURGENT ACTIVITY.**

**B. () FRIENDLY FORCES. GOVERNMENT OF BLUELAND,
GOVERNMENT
OF ORANGELAND.//**

GENTEXT/MISSION/

**2. () WHEN DIRECTED, USCINCCENT WILL CONDUCT MILITARY
OPERATIONS TO _____.//**

GENTEXT/EXECUTION/

**3. () CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. IN CONJUNCTION WITH SHOW-OF-
FORCE AIR AND NAVAL OPERATIONS, SIMULTANEOUSLY INTRODUCE
ARMY AND MARINE FORCES INTO BLUELAND TO AID BLUELAND
FORCES IN ACCORDANCE WITH USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX. CONTINUE
BUILDUP OF GROUND FORCES AND ADVANCE ON _____.**

**4. () FIRST TASKING ASSIGNMENT COMUSARCENT. ON ORDER OF JTF
BLUEBEARD, COMMENCE MOVEMENT OF FORCES OUTLINED IN TASK
ORGANIZATION OF THIS OPORD AND BE PREPARED TO _____.**

**5. () SECOND TASKING ASSIGNMENT COMUSCENTAF. PROVIDE
FORCES
OUTLINED IN TASK ORGANIZATION OF THIS OPORD AND COMMENCE
MOVEMENT OF ASSIGNED FORCES TO BABA AIR BASE TO CLOSE NLT ____.**

**6. () THIRD TASKING ASSIGNMENT USCINCEUR. CHOP CTF 60 TO JTF
BLUEBEARD. ON ORDER FROM CJTF BLUEBEARD, COMMENCE
MOVEMENT OF
MEB OUTLINED IN _____.**

**7. () FOURTH TASKING ASSIGNMENT USTRANSCOM. PROVIDE
AIRLIFT ASSETS TO MEET FORCE LIFT REQUIREMENTS OUTLINED _____.**

**8. () COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS. SEE ALERT ORDER CJCS 270300Z
NOV ____ AS AMENDED HEREIN.**

**A. () THIS OPORD EFFECTIVE FOR PLANNING UPON RECEIPT AND
FOR EXECUTION ON ORDER.**

ANNEX - C

CJCS B. () DIRLAUTH FOR PLANNING AND OPERATIONS WITH INFO
AND ____.

C. () REPORTS WILL BE ____.

D. () ANTICIPATED TIME OF EXECUTION (D-DAY) IS ____.

E. () ROE WILL BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH POLICY OUTLINED IN
USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX.

TO F. () DIRECT COORDINATION WITH USTRANSCOM AUTHORIZED
UPDATE TRANSPORTATION MOVEMENT INFORMATION.
KEEP THIS HEADQUARTERS ADVISED. MOVEMENT SCHEDULE
FROM USTRANSCOM DUE 290400Z NOV ____.

GENTEXT/ADMIN AND LOG/

9. () IN ACCORDANCE WITH USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX AS
AMENDED HEREIN.

10. () MOBILITY/TRANSPORTATION. USTRANSCOM AIRLIFT WILL BE
UTILIZED AS A BASIS FOR NEO FOLLOWED BY SEA EVACUATION
UTILIZING
CTF 60 SHIPPING WHEN ____.

11. () PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE PER ANNEX F AND INSTRUCTIONS
PER COORDINATION WITH USCINCCENT/PA.//

GENTEXT/COMMAND AND SIGNAL/

12. () USCINCCENT IS SUPPORTED CINC.

13. () CTF 60 IS ON-THE-SCENE OPERATIONAL COMMANDER AND WILL
EXERCISE OPCON OF (SPECIFY FORCES) UNTIL HQ USCENCOM FWD
(JTF
BLUEBEARD) IS ACTIVATED.

14. () COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS AS OUTLINED IN ANNEX J,
USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX.

15. () COMMUNICATIONS GUIDANCE PER ANNEX K, USCINCCENT
OPLAN
XXXX AS AMENDED HEREIN.

ANNEX - C

A. () DEDICATED HF VOICE AND TELETYPE LINK WILL BE
ESTABLISHED BETWEEN JTF BLUEBEARD AND U.S. EMBASSY, BLUELAND,
USING XXXX.

AKNLDG/Y//

DECL/OADR//

ANNEX - C